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Introduction 
The  views  regarding  the  incidence  of  the  corporation  income  tax  are  varied,  and  the 
economics  profession  has  not  yet  reached  a definite  conclusion  as  to  who  bears  the  burden  of 
the  tax.  The  incidence  of  the  corporation  income  tax  remains  one  of  the  most  controversial 
subjects  in  economics.  Pechman  (1987)  cites  a number  of  studies  and  describes  the  various 
short-run  and  long-run  shifting  mechanisms  that  are  utilized  in  describing  the  incidence  of  the 
corporation  income  tax.  However,  Pechman  does  not  explore  the  post  Keynesian 
contributions.  In  this  paper,  the  incidence  of  the  corporate  profits  tax is  explicitly  considered 
within  the  Keynesian  tradition.’  In  this  tradition,  the  economy  is  assumed  to  operate  with 
excess  supplies  of  labor  and  capacity.  As  a consequence,  broad  based  tax  changes  impact  on 
aggregate  demand,  employment  and  real  output,  and  these  macroeconomic  effects  come  to 
bear  on  the  incidence  of  corporate  profits  tax. 
In  this  paper  the  Harbergeresque  approach 
post  Keynesians;  the  short  period  and  long  period 
is  considered  in  light  of  the  contributions  of 
incidence  of  the  corporate  profits  tax  is 
‘Taxes  derived  from  other  sources  of  capital  income  will  be ignored  as the  incidence  of these 
taxes,  as  shown  by  Asimakopulos  and  Burbidge  (1974),  are  determined  by  the  operation  of 
different  influences  in  the  economy.  In  the  neoclassical  approach,  taxes  on  income  from  capital 
(taxes  on  profits,  dividends  and  interest)  affect  the  user  costs  of  capital  and,  therefore,  the 
demand  for  capital.  It  is this  theory  that  allows  for  the  lumping  of  taxes  on  income  from  capital 
into  the  analysis  of  corporate  tax  incidence. 2 
discussed;  an  analytical  framework  is  set  up  for  analyzing  the  incidence  of  the  corporate 
profits  tax;  and  some  empirical  observations  are  made.  The  incidence  of  the  corporate  profits 
tax  is  shown  to  be  largely  dependent  upon  the  government’s  budget  stance,  corporate  pricing 
decisions;  corporate  investment  decisions  and  household  savings  decisions.  These  latter 
private  sector  effects,  insofar  as  they  mitigate  the  budget  stance’s  impact  on  the  incidence  of 
the  tax,  are  considered  to  be  indirect  and  relatively  weak.  As  a consequence,  the  government 
budget  stance  is  the  primary  factor  determining  the  incidence  of  the  corporate  profits  tax.  In 
light  of  these  findings,  the  desirability  of  the  corporate  profits  tax  is  reconsidered  and  some 
policy  implications  are  explored. 
Harbergeresque  Models. 
According  to  Gravelle  and  Kotlikoff  (1989,  p.  750),  the  corporation  income  tax  model 
as  developed  by  Harberger  1962  has  become  “remarkably  influential,  .  .  . vanquished  earlier 
.  .  . analyses,  and  has  shifted  the  debate  from  one  of  theory  to  .  .  .  proper  measurement  of 
the  model’s  parameters.”  The  Harberger  model  assesses  the  corporation  income  tax 
incidence  using  a two  sector  (corporate  and  noncorporate)  pre-Keynesian  model.  In  this 
model,  savings,  if  it  takes  place  at  all,  impacts  on  the  level  of  investment,  and  capital  and 
labor  are  assumed  to  be  fi,rlly utilized.  The  imposition  of  the  corporation  income  tax,  in  the 
short-run,  assuming  profit  maximization  and  perfect  competition,  reduces  the  after-tax  rate  of 
profits  causing  corporate  capital  to  bear  the  full  incidence  of  the  tax.  In  the  long  run,  the 
extent  to  which  the  corporation  income  tax  is  shifted  depends  upon  the  relative  shifts  in  the 
demand  for  and  supply  of  corporate  “capital.”  The  corporation  income  tax  reduces  the 3 
demand  for  capital  through  two  channels:  1)  a reduction  in  the  after  tax  rate  of  return;  and 
2)  an  increase  in  the  relative  price  of  goods  produced  in  the  corporate  sector.2  The  decline  in 
the  supply  of  corporate  capital  is  caused  by  a capital  flight  into  the  non-corporate  sector.  If 
the  decline  in  the  demand  for  capital  is  greater  than  the  reduction  in  the  supply  of  corporate 
capital,  then  corporations,  in  the  long  run,  bear  some,  all  or  more  than  all  of  the  increase  of 
the  corporation  income  tax.  Gravelle  and  Kotlikoff  (1989)  modify  the  standard  Harberger 
model  by  allowing  corporate  and  noncorporate  production  in  the  same  sector,3  and  by 
allowing  for  intra-sector  substitution  of  products  and  factors  while  maintaining  the  basic  pre- 
Keynesian  assumptions.  As  a consequence,  the  thrust  of  their  conclusions  are  the  same  as 
Harberger’s.  Corporate  capital  fully  bears  the  burden  of  the  corporation  income  tax  in  the 
short  run,  and  the  long-run  incidence  depends  upon  factor  and  product  elasticities  of 
substitution  and  the  relative  elasticities  of  product  demand,  among  other  things.  Gravelle  and 
Kotlikoff  (1989,  p.  779)  end  their  article  by  hoping  for  a  “rebirth  of  analytical  attention  to  the 
‘The  corporation  income  tax  increases  the  price  of  capital  relative  to  labor.  The  increase  in 
the  relative  price  of  capital  induces  a greater  use  of  labor.  The  increased  use  of  labor  results  in 
an  increased  marginal  cost  and  in  the  corporate  sector  price  level.  See  Stiglitz,  1988,  pp.  567  - 
571. 
3According  to  Gravelle  and  Kotlikoff  (1989,  p.  750),  the  standard  Harberger  model  allows 
for  differential  tax  analysis  of  capital  producing  different  products,  but  not  for  the  analysis  of 
corporate  taxation,  per  se. [question  of]  .  .  . what  the  corporation  income  tax  precisely  does.” 
Even  though  the  Harbergeresque  models  have  enjoyed  great  popularity  and  have 
served  as  the  basis  for  a number  of  empirical  studies,  these  models  have  been  shown  to  be 
irrelevant--ignoring  the  central  features  of  a capitalist  economy  and  empirically  inconsistent-- 
incorporating  ad  hoc  Keynesian  cyclical  variables  into  pre-Keynesian  models  (see  Burbidge, 
1976).  Following  the  work  of  Kalecki  (197 l/l  937),  Asimakopulos  and  Burbidge  (1974) 
show,  in  assessing  the  impact  and  incidence  of  taxation,  that  the  aggregate  demand  effects 
must  be  considered  following  a  change  in  any  broad  based  tax.  These  aggregate  demand 
effects  are  related  to  the  government  budget  stance,  and  to  the  response  of  business  pricing 
decisions.  For  example,  government  may  increase  its  spending  or  reduce  other  taxes  in 
response  to  an  increase  in  the  corporate  profits  tax,  and/or  corporations  may  increase  their 
markups  and  prices  in  response  to  increases  in  the  corporate  profits  tax. 
In  studying  the  incidence  of  taxation,  post  Keynesians  have  found  it  convenient  to 
break  the  study  up  into  two  parts:  1) a  study  of  short-period  tax  incidence;  and  2)  a  study  of 
long-period  tax  incidence.  In  the  Harberger  approaches,  the  short  period  is  defined  in  the 
classical  sense:  as  the  time  where  the  corporate  sector’s  capital  stock  remains  constant 
following  a  change  in  the  corporate  tax.  With  constant  capital  stock  and  demand  conditions 
and  with  no  substitution  of  labor  for  capital,  marginal  cost,  and,  thus  price,  remains  constant 
following  a change  in  the  corporate  tax  rate.4  In  contrast,  post  Keynesians,  like 
4This  approach  has  caused  others,  like  Musgrave  and  Musgrave  (1989),  to  conclude  that 
short-run  shifting  is  the  consequence  of  non  profit  maximizing  behavior. 5 
Asimakopulos  and  Burbidge  (1979),  define  the  short  period  as  the  time  where  investment  is 
fixed  (by  past  decisions)  and  capacity  utilization  varies  with  respect  to  changes  in  aggregate 
demand.  Asimakopulos  and  Burbidge  (1979,  p.  7 1) argue  that  the  short  period,  as  so  defined, 
can  be  measured  in  .  .  .  “calendar  time,  for  example  a quarter  of  a year,  a half  of  a year  or 
even  a year  .  .  .‘I  The  long  period  is  that  time  where  capacity  also  varies--where  past 
investment  decisions  impact  on  the  present. 
A Framework  for Assessing  Tax Incidence. 
In  order  to  analyze  the  incidence  of  the  corporate  profits  tax,  an  accounting  identity 
for  corporate  profits  is  derived  from  the  National  Income  and  Product  Accounts  (NIPA).  This 
identity  is  similar  to  Kalecki’s  (1968)  famous  profit  identity  which  shows  the  various  sources 
of  aggregate  profits.  The  corporate  profits  identity  utilized  here  was  illustrated  by  Levy  and 
Levy  (1983).  On  the  aggregate,  profits  are  shown  to  be  related  to  investment,  the  government 
budget  surplus  and  personal  savings,  among  other  things.  Aggregate  profits  are  caused  by 
investment,  for  example,  because  businesses  cannot  decide  to  earn  profits  but  businesses  can 
make  decisions  that  impact  on  profits  (see  Kalecki  1968,  p.  55).  As  Levy  and  Levy  (1983) 
show,  manipulation  of  the  savings  and  investment  identity  in  the  NIPA  yields  the  following 
expression  for  corporate  profits  (see  the  Appendix  for  the  complete  derivation): 
Post-tax  corporate  profits  with  inventory  valuation  and  capital  consumption  adjustments 
=  Gross  Investment 
+  Government  budget  deficit 
+  dividends 
Personal  Savings 6 
Consumption  of  Fixed  Capital 
Wage  accruals  less  disbursements 
Capital  grants  received  by  the  U.  S.  (net) 
Statistical  Discrepancy 
By  recognizing  that  the  consumption  of  fixed  capital  can  be  broken  down  into  corporate  and 
noncorporate  components;  and  by  adding  the  corporate  component  to  both  sides,  and  by 
subtracting  the  capital  consumption  and  inventory  valuation  adjustments  from  both  sides,  and 
by  adding  corporate  net  interest  to  both  sides,  gross  post-tax  corporate  profits  can  be  written 
as  (see  the  Appendix): 
Gross  post-tax  corporate  profits  (=undistributed  corporate  profits  + dividends  +  corporate  net 
interest  +  corporate  consumption  of  fixed  capital) 
=  Gross  Investment 
Corporate  inventory  valuation  adjustment 
Corporate  capital  consumption  adjustment 
+  Government  budget  deficit 
+  dividends 
+  corporate  net  interest 
Personal  Savings 
Noncorporate  capital  consumption  allowance  with  inventory 
valuation  and  capital  consumption  adjustments 
Wage  accruals  less  disbursements 
Capital  grants  received  by  the  U.  S.  (net) 
Statistical  Discrepancy 
This  latter  expression  will  serve  as  the  basis  for  analyzing  the  incidence  of  the  corporate 
profits  tax. 
Determining  what  post-tax  corporate  profits  would  be  in  the  absence  of  a change  in 
the  corporate  profits  tax  is  more  complicated  than  that  implied  by  the  identity:  that  a dollar increase  in  the  corporate  profits  tax  reduces  post-tax  corporate  profits  by  one  dollar.  The 
complication  arises  because  other  things  are  not  constant  with  respect  to  the  change  in  the 
corporate  profits  tax.  Following  a change  in  the  corporate  profits  tax,  other  tax  receipts 
and/or  government  purchases  may  change,  and  these  changes  can  generate  aggregate  demand 
effects.  (see  Burbidge,  1976,  p.  229).  As  a consequence,  the  incidence  of  the  corporate 
profits  tax  is  analyzed  by  considering  the  macroeconomic  adjustments  that  result  from  a 
change  in  the  tax  and  how  these  adjustment  come  to  bear  on  corporate  profits.  As 
Asimakopulos  and  Burbidge  (1979,  p.  79)  stress,  a  “causal  story”  is  needed  to  explain  the 
incidence  of  the  corporate  profits  tax;  and  as  Burbidge  (1976,  p.  233)  stresses  “macro  models 
with micro foundations  [Burbidge’s  emphasis]  which  link  short  period  stories  will  provide  a 
consistent  and  useful  approach”  for  analyzing  the  incidence  of  taxation.  Unfortunately, 
macro  models  have  not  explicitly  considered  the  incidence  question,  for  example  see  Arestis 
and  Driver  (1988)  and  Eichner  (1979).  As  such,  in  the  next  section  a  small  macro  model  is 
constructed  to  illustrate  the  short-period  and  long-period  incidence  of  the  corporate  profits  tax, 
but  first  a  causal  story  is  considered. 
A  causal  story.  To  illustrate  the  incidence  of  the  corporate  profits  tax,  suppose  that 
the  latter  four  categories  of  the  post-tax  corporate  profits  identity  are  zero,  therefore,  the 
analysis  of  the  incidence  of  the  corporation  profits  tax  can  be  restricted  to  the  tax’s  impact  on 
gross  investment,  the  government  budget  deficit  and  the  difference  between  the  sum  of 
corporate  net  interest  and  dividends  and  personal  savings.  In  the  short  period,  assuming  gross 
investment  is  fixed  by  past  decisions,  the  incidence  of  the  corporate  profits  tax  is  limited  to 
the  tax’s  impact  on  the  government  budget  deficit,  and  the  difference  between  the  sum  of corporate  net  interest  and  dividends  and  personal  savings.’  Under  a balanced  budget 
constraint  (with  compensating  changes  in  government  spending),6  a tax  change,  like  an 
increase  in  the  corporate  profits  tax,  that  leads  to  an  increase  in  aggregate  demand,  through 
balanced  budget  effect,  will,  under  competitive  conditions,  cause  an  increase  in  business 
8 
a 
markups  and  prices  which  will,  in  turn,  reduce  real  wages  and  personal  savings,  and  increase 
post-tax  corporate  profits.7  Under  non-competitive  conditions,  with  personal  savings 
insensitive  to  changes  in  current  income,  aggregate  post-tax  profits  will  be  unaffected  by  a 
change  in  the  tax.  In  the  long  period,  assuming  competitive  conditions,  the  short-period 
increase  in  profits  leads  to  additional  profits  to  finance  investment,  and,  as  a  consequence, 
current  investment  decisions  and  future  investment  expenditures  and  profits  increase.  JYn 
contrast  to  the  Harbergeresque  models,  the  post  Keynesian  approach  allows  for  partial,  full  or 
5As Kalecki  (1971/l  937)  showed,  under  some  restrictive  conditions  and  a balanced  budget 
constraint,  an  increase  in  profits  tax  has  no  impact  on  the  aggregate  level  of  profits. 
‘Competitive  conditions  refer  to  a situation  where  the  price  of  wage  goods  rise  in  response 
to  a  change  in  aggregate  demand  (see  Asimakopulos  and  Burbidge  1979,  p.76),  and 
noncompetitive  conditions  refers  to  a  situation  where  the  price  of  wage  goods  remain  constant 
with  respect  to  a change  in  aggregate  demand. 
70n  the  basis  of  this  conclusion,  Burbidge  (1976)  considered  the  Harbergeresque  models 
irrelevant  and  inconsistent  (when  such  models  include  ad  hoc  Keynesian  cyclical  variables). 9 
more  than  full  shifting  of  the  corporate  profits  tax  in  the  short-run,  even  under  competitive 
conditions;  and  the  impact  of  the  corporate  profits  tax  in  the  long  period  is  tied  to,  not 
independent  of,  the  short  period  tax  incidence.  These  results  are  expressed  more  formally  in 
a  simple  macro  model. 
A Corporate  Tax Incidence  Model 
To  begin,  the  profits  identity  is rewritten  as: 
(1)  P  =  I  + X  -  (In-G)  +  D  -  Sp  - Z; 
where  P  =  gross  post-tax  corporate  profits;  I  = gross  private  domestic  investment  less  the 
inventory  valuation  adjustment;  X  =  net  foreign  investment;  Tn  =  net  (of  transfer  payments) 
government  receipts;  G  = government  purchases;  D  = the  sum  of  corporate  net  interest  and 
dividends;  Sp  = personal  savings;  and  Z  = the  sum  of  noncorporate  consumption  of  fixed 
capital,  wage  accruals  less  disbursements,  capital  grants  received  by  the  U.  S.  and  the 
statistical  discrepancy. 
In  order  to  determine  the  incidence  of  the  corporate  profits  tax,  the  structural 
determinants  of  the  variables  on  the  right  hand  side  of  the  identity  are  briefly  considered. 
For  the  sake  of  simplicity,  net  foreign  investment  and  the  sum  of  wage  accruals  less 
disbursements,  capital  grants  to  the  U.  S.  and  the  statistical  discrepancy  are  treated  as 
exogenous  variables. 
Gross  private  Investment.  Gross  private  investment,  by  definition,  is  the  sum  of 
gross  fixed  investment,  residential  construction  and  changes  in  business  inventories.  To 10 
simplify  the  analysis,  the  determinants  of  business  fixed  investment  will  be  considered,  and 
the  other  categories  will  be  ignored. 
Following  Kalecki  (1968  and  1971/1968)  fixed  investment  is  expressed  as  a  function  of 
the  past  level  of  entrepreneurial  savings,  changes  in  a past  level  of  profits;  i.e.: 
(2)  I, =  VSE,,,  AP,,); 
where  SE  =  entrepreneurial  savings  (the  internal  savings  of  the  corporation  plus  the  personal 
savings  of  controlling  group  (see  Kalecki,  1968,  p.  97));  and  T  =  the  time  lag  necessary  for 
investment  decisions  to  be  translated  into  investment  expenditures.  According  to  Kalecki 
(1968),  firms  will  be  induced  to  undertake  new  investment  following  a change  in  the 
economic  environment.  A  change  in  the  economic  environment  occurs  when  businesses 
accumulate  savings  out  of  profits  and  when  the  rate  of  profits  change.  The  latter  term  in 
equation  2  largely  determines  the  change  in  the  rate  of  profits.  Since  no  precise  measure 
controlling  group’s  personal  savings  exists,  it  assumed  to  be  a function  of  corporate  profits 
and  it  is  written  as: 
(3)  SE  =  SE(P). 
Thus  equation  2  is  rewritten  as: 
(2’)  I, =  T(P,,,  Apt-T). 
Government  purchases.  Government  purchases  are  assumed  to  be  dependent  upon  net 
tax  receipts  and  the  purchases  of  the  previous  period;  i.e.: 
(4)  Gt =  G(Tn,,  G,_,). 
This  equation  is  used  to judge  the  short-period  government  budget  stance,  and  any  long- period  dynamic  relationship  between  government  purchases  and  net  tax  receipts  is  ignored.* 
11 
Net  Government  Receipts.  Net  government  receipts  by  definition  equal  gross 
government  receipts  less  transfer  payments.  Here  transfer  payments  are  broadly  defined  as 
government  expenditures  less  government  purchases  of  final  goods  and  services.  As  such,  net 
tax  receipts  are  written  as: 
(5)  Tn  = Tp  + Tc  + Ti  + Tcsi  - GTP, 
where  Tn  = net  tax  receipts,  Tp  = personal  tax  receipts;  Tc=  corporate  profit  tax  receipts 
(accruals);  Ti  =  indirect  business  tax  receipts;  Tcsi  =  contributions  to  social  insurance;  and 
GTP  =  government  transfer  payments.  As  a first  approximation,  expressions  for  the  right 
hand  side  of  5  are  found. 
Total  personal  taxes  are  written  as  a function  of  personal  income;  i.e.: 
(6)  TP  = TP(YP); 
where  Yp  = personal  income.  In  a  similar  manner,  the  corporate 
function  of  the  pre-tax  corporate  profits  and  the  corporate  profits 
(7)  Tc  = Tc(tc,  Pg); 
profits  tax  is  written  as  a 
tax  rate;  i.e.: 
where  tc  =  corporate  profits  tax  rate;  and  Pg  = pre-tax  net  corporate  profits.  The  remaining 
variables  in  net  tax  receipts  are  combined  and  simply  expressed  as  a function  of  aggregate 
‘The  presence  of  a  long  period  (dynamic)  relationship  between  government  spending  and 
taxation  has  been  described  by  Peacock 
considered,  their  theory  of  public  sector 
tax  incidence. 
and  Wiseman  (1961).  Although  this  has  not  yet  been 
growth  has  relevance  for  the  analysis  of 12 
income;  i.e.: 
(8)  T’  = T’(Y); 
where  T’  = the  sum  of  indirect  business  taxes,  contributions  for  social  insurance  less 
government  transfer  payments;  and  Y  =  aggregate  income. 
Corporate  Net  Interest  and  Dividends.  As  a first  approximation,  the  sum  of  corporate 
net  interest  and  dividends  is  simply  expressed  as  a function  of  gross  post  tax  profits;  i.e.: 
(9)  D  =  D(P). 
Personal  Savings.  Personal  savings  is  represented  simply  as  a function  of  disposable 
personal  income  and  a past  level  of  personal  savings.  Thus  personal  savings  is  expressed  as: 
(10)  SP, =  SP(Ydt,  Sp,,); 
where  Yd  = disposable  personal  income. 
Aggregate  Income.  Aggregate  income,  like  in  Kalecki’s  1968  model,  is  expressed  as  a 
function  of  a distribution  parameter,  the  wage  share,  which  may  vary  with  respect  to  the 
change  in  corporate  profits  tax  (see  Laramie  and  Mair  1993),  and  the  aggregate  level  of  pre- 
tax  corporate  profits;  i.e.: 
(11)  Y  =  Y(a,  Pg); 
‘Kalecki  (1968)  illustrated  this  relationship  by  writing  the  wage  and  salary  share  as: 
V/Y  = B/Y  + a ; where  V  = the  pre-tax  wage  and  salary  bill;  B  = pre-tax  salaries.  By  defining 
V  =  Y  - Pg  and  collecting  terms:  Y  =  [B  +  Pg]/( l-a). 
According  to  Kalecki  (1968,  p.  61),  “national  income  .  .  .  is  pushed  up  to  a  point  at  which 
profits  out  of  it  are  determined  by  the  distribution  factors.” 13 
where  a = the  wage  share;  and  the  wage  share  can  be  written  as: 
(12)  a = a( tc). 
To  complete  the  model,  disposable  personal  income,  pre-tax  net  profits  and  disposable 
personal  income  are  respectively  defined.  To  simplify  the  analysis  we  assume  that  disposable 
income  can  be  written  as: 
(13)  Yd  = Y,  - NCCAo  - T’  - Tp  - (Pg  - D);” 
where  NCCAo  =  the  noncorporate  consumption  of  fixed  capital  (assumed  to  be  exogenous). 
Pre-tax  corporate  profits  gross  of  corporate  consumption  of  fixed  capital  is  defined  as: 
(14)  Pg  =  P  + Tc; 
and  personal  income  is  defined  as: 
(15)  Yp  =  Yd  + Tp. 
Within  this  framework,  both  the  short-period  and  long-period  tax  incidence  is 
discussed.  In  particular,  two  cases  are  considered:  a)  fixed  government  purchases,  i.e. 
dG/dT  =  0;  and  b)  a balanced  budget  constraint,  i.e  dG/dT  =  1. 
Fixed  Government  Purchases. 
“The  National  Income  and  Product  Account  definition  of  disposable  personal  income  is:  Y 
+ (RF1  - PFI)  - NCCAo  - T’  - SD  - (Pg  - D)  + IPCB  - BTPF  - WAD  -Tp;  where  RF1 = receipts 
of  factor  income  from  the  rest  of  the  world;  PFI=  payments  of  factor  income  to  the  rest  of  the 
In  this  case,  assuming  the  increase  in  the  corporate 
world;  SD  =  statistical  discrepancy;  IPCB  = interest  paid  by  consumers  to  businesses;  BTPF  = 
business  transfer  payments  to  foreigners;  and  WAD  =  wage  accruals  less 
disbursements. 14 
profits  tax  rate  results  in  an  increase  in  government  tax  revenues,  corporate  post-tax  profits 
fall.  To  illustrate,  consider  the  case  where  all  profits  are  retained  by  businesses  and  the  only 
tax  is  the  corporate  profits  tax.  Given  that  investment  is  exogenous  in  the  short  period,  an 
increase  in  the  corporate  profits  tax  has  no  impact  on  aggregate  demand,  aggregate  income, 
disposable  personal  income  and  personal  savings.”  The  decline  in  corporate  profits  is 
attributable  to  the  decline  in 
is  dampened,  if  corporations 
the  government  budget  deficit.  This  decline  in  corporate  profits 
increase  their  markups  with  respect  to  the  increase  in  corporate 
profits  tax  rate  and  if  the  increase  in  markups  reduces  personal  savings.  The  increase  in  the 
corporate  profits  tax  rate,  via  a  change  in  corporate  markups,  reduces  the  distribution 
parameter  and  aggregate  demand,  which,  in  turn,  reduces  the  levels  of  income  and  personal 
savings.  It  is  through  the  decline  in  personal  savings  that  the  corporate  profits  tax  is  shifted 
this  contractionary  budget  stance.12  These  results  are  expressed  formally  in  the  Appendix 
in 
“The  increase  in the  corporate  tax has  no  impact  on disposable  personal  income  because  pre- 
tax  profits,  which  are  removed  from  aggregate  income  in  deriving  disposable  personal  income, 
is  unaffected  by  the  increase  in  the  corporate  profits  tax. 
‘%  an  open  economy,  assuming  import  substitution,  the  ability  of  domestic  corporations  to 
change  raise  markups  with  respect  to  an  increase  in  the  corporate  profits  tax  is  limited  by  the 
degree  of  international  competition.  An  increase  in  imports  diminishes  the  extent  to  which  the 
corporate  profits  tax  is  shifted. 15 
for  the  model  outlined  above. 
In  the  long  period,  investment  may  respond  to  these  changes.  Insofar  as  the  increase 
in  the  profits  tax  rate  has  reduced  the  level  of  profits,  future  investment  will  decline.  This 
decline  in  investment  will  increase  corporation’s  tax  burden  over  the  long  period,  as 
investment  is  a  source  of  profits. 
If  businesses  increase  their  markups  and,  hence,  personal  savings  declines,  the  level  of 
profits  may  be  restored,  but  the  resulting  fall  in  the  aggregate  levels  of  demand  and  income 
may  discourage  future  investment  and,  thus,  increase  the  long-period  tax  burden. 
A Balanced  Budget  Constraint.  In the  short  period,  with  constant  markups,  the 
change  in  the  corporate  profits  tax  still  has  a negative  impact  on  level  of  profits,  but  this 
negative  impact  is  less  than  in  the  previous  case.  The  increase  in  the  corporate  profits  tax, 
insofar  as  it  results  in  additional  profit  tax  revenues,  will  increase  the  level  of  gross  profits, 
via  the  balanced  budget  effect,  and,  given  the  distribution  parameter,  increase  the  aggregate 
and  disposable  levels  of  income.  The  rise  in  disposable  personal  income  increases  personal 
savings  and  reduces  after  tax  profits.  In  this  case,  a sufficient  condition,  but  not  a necessary 
condition  for  post-tax  profits  to  remain  constant  is  for  personal  savings  to  remain  unchanged 
with  respect  to  the  increase  in  disposable  income.13  Again,  if  corporations  alter  their 
13An  implication  derived  from  this  result  is  that  government  would  have  to  increases  its 
deficit  with  respect  to  the  increase  in  the  corporate  profits  tax  in  order  for  post  tax  profits  to 
remain  constant.  Also,  you  might  consider  the  special  case  where  the  marginal  propensity  to 
save  is  approximately  one  (like  in  Friedman’s  permanent  income  hypothesis). 
In  this  case,  the  associated  rise  in  personal  savings  further  reduces  post  tax  profits.  The 16 
markups  in  response  to  the  change  in  the  corporate  profits  tax  rate,  then  the  effect  described 
in  the  previous  case  applies.14  Corporations  regain  some  of  their  profits  but  at  the  expense 
of  the  aggregate  level  of  income.  Again  these  results  are  formally  expressed  in  the  Appendix 
for  the  model  outlined  above. 
The  extent  to  which  the  long  period  tax  burden  changes  depends  upon  the  effects 
mentioned  above.  The  rise  in  the  corporate  profits  tax  may  inhibit  further  investment  and 
increase  the  long-period  burden  of  the  tax. 
Again  if  corporations  alter  markups  in  response  to  the  tax  change,  the  results  of  the 
previous  case  again  hold. 
Corporate  Tax  Changes  and  Profit  Changes:  A  Look  at  the  Data. 
As  indicated  above,  the  short-period  incidence  of  the  corporation  profits  tax  is  widely 
influenced  by  two  factors:  1) the  government  budget  stance;  and  2)  the  reaction  of  personal 
savings  to  a change  in  the  corporate  profits  tax.  An  examination  of  annual  corporate  profits 
incidence  of  the  tax  lies  somewhere  between  the  constant  government  purchase  case  and  the 
balanced  budget  case  when  0  <  MPS  C  1. 
14Damania  and  Mair  (1992),  in  the  Kaleckain  tradition,  have  argued,  that  under  conditions 
of  oligopoly,  the  markup  may  actually  fall  during  an increase  in aggregate  demand.  Conceivably 
this  kind  of  aggregate  demand  pressure  may  swamp  any  pressure  to  increase  markups  following 
an  increase  in  the  corporate  profits  tax. 17 
data,  as  published  in  the  NIPA,  suggests  that  conditions  have  been  such  so  as  to  eliminate 
some  of  the  effects  the  corporate  profits  tax  has  had  on  post-tax  profits  (the  data  is presented 
in  Table  1A  in  the  Appendix).  These  offsetting  effects  are  not  only  reflected  in  changes  in 
the  government  budget  deficit  and  personal  savings  but  also  in  changes  in  gross  investment 
(which,  in  the  short  period,  may  represent  a hangover  effect).  In  assessing  the  impact  of  the 
corporate  profit’s  tax  on  corporate  profits,  the  overall  trend  in  gross  pre-tax  profits,  gross 
after-tax  profits  and  the  corporate  profit  tax  shares  of  GDP  are  examined;  and  four  corporate 
tax  changes  are  considered:  a)  the  increase  in  the  corporate  profits  tax  during  the  Korean 
war;  b)  the  imposition  of  a  surtax  on  corporate  profits  during  the  Viet  Nam  War  (1968  and 
1969);  c)  the  increase  in  corporate  profits  tax  following  the  1986  Tax  Reform  Act;  and  d)  the 
reduction  in  the  corporate  profits  tax  following  the  Economic  Recovery  Act  of  198 1.  To 
illustrate,  each  of  the  sources  of  profits  were  deflated  using  the  GDP  deflator  instead  of  their 
own  particular  deflator.  This  convention  was  adopted  to  insure  that  the  right  hand  side  of  the 
profits  identity  added  up  to  the  left  hand  side--profits.‘5 
Overall,  during  the  period  1947  to  199 1, the  gross  post-tax  corporate  profit  share  of 
“Kalecki  (1968,  p.  119)  assumed  that  the  price  index  to  deflate  investment  goods  was 
identical  with  the  gross  product  deflator.  Ideally  profits  should  be  deflated  according  to  some 
weighted  index  of  consumer  goods  and  capital  goods  that  are  purchased  with  profits.  However 
no  such  index  exists  (see  Toporowski,  1992).  Moreover,  if  each  of  the  variables  were  deflated 
according  to  their  own  price  index,  there  is no  guarantee  that  the  deflated  sum  of  sources  on  the 
right  hand  side  of  the  identity  would  add  up  to  the  deflated  value  of  profits. 18 
GDP  appears  to move  inversely  with  the  corporate  tax  share of  GDP--see  Figure  1.  As 
shown  in  Figure  1, the  gross  post-tax  corporate  profit  share of  GDP appears  to  increase  on  a 
long-run  trend,  and  the  corporate  profits  tax  share of  GDP appears  to decrease  on  a long-run 
trend.  If  the  two  series  are  combined,  then  the gross  pre-tax  profits  share  of  GDP  appears  to 
exhibit  a zero  trend.  This  evidence  suggest  that  corporations  have  been  able  to  increase  their 
share  of  GDP primarily  through  reductions  in the  corporate  tax liability  and  that  the  incidence 
of  the  corporate  profits  tax,  over  the  long  period,  by  and large  falls  upon  corporations  (in  the 
sense  that  corporations  are able  to  capture  the reduction  in the  corporate  tax  share  of  GDP). 
The  evidence  also  suggests  that  changes  in the  corporate  tax code  have  altered  economic 
incidence  of  the  profits  tax. 
VI 
Figure  1.  Gross  Pre-Tax  Profits  Share  of  GDP (top);  Gross After-Tax 
Profits  Share  of  GDP  (middle);  Corporate  Profits  Tax  Share  of  GDP  (bottom) 
from  1947 to  1991. 
Following  the  outbreak  of the  Korean  war in  1950, an excess profits  tax  was placed  on 
corporate  profits  and  the  corporate  profits  tax rate  increased  from  42%  in  1950 to  50.75%  in 
195 1 (see  Pechman,  1987).  In  1950, the  real  corporate  profit  tax  liability  jumped  by  about 73%,  and  real  profits  increased  by  about  20.2%.  Moreover,  in  1950,  the  corporate  profit  tax 
and  profit  shares  of  GDP  increased  respectively  by  2.3  and  1.2 percentage  points.  In  195 1 
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some  of  these  effects  were  offset.  The  real  corporate  tax  liability  increased  by  about  20% 
while  corporate  profits  fell  by  9%;  the  corporate  profit  tax  share  increased  by  .6 of  a 
percentage  point  and  the  profit  share  fell  by  2.2  percentage  points.  If  1950  and  195 1 are 
combined,  then  the  2.9  percentage  point  increase  in  the  corporate  profit  tax  share  can  be 
compared  to  a  1 percentage  point  decrease  in  the  corporate  profit  share.  These  relative 
movements  in  the  respective  shares  suggest  some  shifting  of  the  corporate  profits  tax. 
It  is  interesting  to  consider  the  sources  of  changes  in  corporate  profits  during  these 
years.  In  1950  the  increase  in  corporate  profits  occurred  during  an  investment  rebound,  with 
gross  fixed  investment  increasing  53.8%  over  the  previous  year.  Fixed,  inventory  and 
residential  construction  jumped  significantly  during  1950.  However  both  public  and  private 
savings  rose  significantly.  The  real  government  deficit  in  1949  of  $16.6  billion  was 
transformed  into  a real  government  budget  surplus  of  $35.1  billion  in  1950,  while  real 
personal  savings  rose  by  $25.7  billion  or  by  73%.  Moreover  personal  savings  minus  the  sum 
of  corporate  net  interest  and  dividends  increased  by  about  $19.3  billion  or  by  1830%.16  In 
195 1, real  gross  investment  continued  to  grow  and  the  government  budget  surplus  declined, 
“The  difference  between  between  the  sum  of net  interest  and  dividends  and  personal  savings 
is  akin  to  Kalecki’s  (1968)  measures  of  the  difference  between  capitalist  consumption  and 
worker  savings.  A  rise  in  worker  savings  relative  to  capitalist  consumption  reduces  the  level  of 
profits. 20 
but  real  personal  savings  increased  relative  to  the  sum  net  interest  and  dividends.  The  $21 
billion  increase  in  personal  savings  relative  to  the  sum  of  net  interest  and  dividends  accounts 
for  much  of  the  decline  in  profits. 
The  effects  of  the  surtax  on  corporate  profits  during  the  Viet  Nam  War  are  somewhat 
similar.  A  surtax  during  the  years  1968  and  1969  increased  the  corporate  tax  rate  from  48% 
to  52.8%  and  the  investment  tax  credit  was  suspended  during  the  latter  part  of  1969  (see 
Pechman,  1987).  The  surtax  was  reduced  and  the  corporate  tax  rate  fell  to  49.2%  in  1970.  It 
was  eliminated  in  197 1.  In  1968,  the  real  corporate  profits  tax  liability  jumped  by  about  15% 
as  real  corporate  profits  increased  by  1.5%.  The  real  corporate  profit  tax  share  of  real  GDP 
increased  by  .4  of  a percentage  point  while  the  corporate  profit  share  fell  by  .3 of  a 
percentage  point.  As  in  1950,  the  increase  in  profits  can  be  attributed,  in  part,  to  an  increase 
in  investment,  as  the  government  deficit  fell.  Gross  investment  increased  by  about  4.5%. 
Moreover,  real  personal  savings  declined  by  about  8.7%,  and  the  difference  between  personal 
savings  and  the  sum  of  corporate  net  interest  and  dividends  decreased  by  about  $17.6  billion 
or  by  about  30%.  In  1969,  real  corporate  profit  taxes  decreased  by  4.1%  and  corporate 
profits  declined  by  1.2%  as  real  gross  investment  rose  by  6.6%.  The  decline  in  corporate 
profits  can  be  attributed  to  the  increase  in  the  real  government  budget  surplus  offsetting  the 
combined  effects  of  the  fall  in  the  difference  between  real  personal  savings  and  the  sum  of 
corporate  net  interest  and  dividends  and  the  rise  in  gross  investment.  In  this  year,  both  the 
real  profit  and  the  tax  shares  of  GDP  fell.  Overall  during  the  period,  the  corporate  profits  tax 
share  increased  by  .l  of  a percentage  point  while  the  profit  share  declined  by  .7  of  a 
percentage  point. 21 
In  1986,  following  the  Tax  Reform  Act,  where  depreciation  rates  were  reduced  and  the 
investment  tax  credit  was  eliminated,  the  definition  of  taxable  income  was  broadened  and  the 
corporate  tax  rate  was  decreased  from  46%  to  32%,  the  real  corporate  profits  tax  liability 
increased  respectively  by  7.5%  and  15.6%  in  1986  and  1987.  In  1986,  real  corporate  profits 
fell  by  1%  while  real  gross  investment  declined  by  5.9%.  This  fall  in  investment  accounts  for 
a large  part  of  the  decline  in  profits  as  the  real  government  deficit  increased  and  the 
difference  between  real  personal  savings  and  the  sum  of  corporate  net  interest  and  dividends 
declined.  In  1987,  real  profits  recovered  as  investment  increased  and  the  deficit  contracted. 
The  increase  in  profits  in  this  year  can  be,  by  and  large,  attributed  to  a 26.6%  reduction  in 
personal  savings  (as  the  sum  of  corporate  net  interest  and  dividends  remained  roughly 
constant)  and  to  the  4.4%  increase  in  gross  investment.  In  1986,  the  corporate  profits  tax 
share  remained  roughly  constant  while  the  profit  share  declined  by  about  .5 of  a percentage 
point.  In  1987  both  shares  increased.  If  both  1986  and  1987  are  combined,  the  profit  and  tax 
shares  both  increased  by  .4 of  a percentage  point. 
Following  the  Economic  Recovery  Act  of  1981,  which  accelerated  the  depreciation 
rates  and  liberalized  the  investment  tax  credit,  the  real  corporate  tax  liability  fell  by  about 
26.7%  in  1982  and  then  increased  by  17.9%  in  1983.  In  1982  corporate  profits  fell  by  about 
6.2%  as  real  gross  investment  decreased  by  about  19.4%.  The  238%  increase  in  the 
government  budget  deficit  reduced  the  fall  in  profits.  In  this  year,  both  the  profit  tax  and 
profit  shares  decreased  respectively  by  .7  and  .6 of  a percentage  point.  In  1983  profits 
increased  by  3%  as  gross  investment  declined  by  6.7%,  because  the  government  budget 
deficit  increased  by  23.9%  and  personal  savings  relative  to  the  sum  of  corporate  net  interest 22 
and  dividends  fell  by  23.6%.  For  1982-1983  combined,  the  corporate  tax  and  profit  shares 
declined  respectively  .4  and  .7 of  a percentage  point. 
Table  1 below  summarizes  the  movements  in  the  real  corporate  profits  tax,  real  post- 
tax  corporate  profits,  profits  share  of  GDP  and  the  tax  share  of  GDP  for  the  above  mentioned 
years.  The  less  than  or  equal  sign  between  the  last  two  columns  indicates  whether  the  change 
in  the  profit  share  was  less  than,  greater  than  or  equal  to  the  change  in  the  tax  share. 
Year(s)  Corporate  Post-Tax 
Profits  Corporate 
Tax  Profits 
Profits 
Share 
of  GDP 
Tax 
Share 
of  GDP 
1950-51  +  <  + 
1968-1969  +  >  + 
1982-83  +  >  - 
1986-87  +  +  +  =  + 
Table  1.  The  Movement  in  Post-tax  Profits  Immediately  Following  Major  Corporate  Tax 
Changes. 
The  evidence  suggests  that  the  impact  of  changes  in  the  corporation  profits  tax  on  corporate 
post-tax  profits  was  mitigated  by  changes  in  other  factors  despite  the  contractionary 
government  budget  stances  in  some  years.  In  particular,  when  corporate  tax  rates  were 
increased,  and  the  government  surplus  increased,  either  increases  in  gross  investment,  perhaps 
due  to  a hangover  effect,  or  a reduction  in  personal  savings  relative  to  the  sum  of  net 
corporate  interest  and  dividends  offset,  to  some  extent,  the  decline  in  profits.  The  important 
question,  as  stated  above,  is  how  are  the  factors  on  the  right  side  of  the  profits  identity  related 
to  each  other  and  to  the  corporate  profits  tax.  To  determine  this,  the  structural  parameters  of the  model  have  to  be  estimated.  It  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper  to  estimate  the  structural 
parameters  of  a complete  macro  model.  However,  some  key  relationships  will  be  examined. 
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A  Statistical  Illustration 
In  order  to  statistically  illustrate  the  incidence  of  the  corporate  profits  tax,  specific 
expressions  for  post-tax  corporate  profits,  gross  investment,  government  purchases,  personal 
savings,  and  aggregate  income  are  examined.  The  shifting  of  the  corporate  profits  tax  is 
channelled  through  the  profits  equation  and  is  affected  by  the  behavior  of  gross  investment, 
government  purchases,  personal  savings,  and  the  aggregate  level  of  income,  among  other 
things. 
The  expression  for  corporate  profits  estimated  is  derived  by  assuming  that  the  sum  of 
dividends  and  net  corporate  interest  can  be  written  as: 
(16)  D, =  Do  +d,(Pt)  + dZDt_,; 
and  by  plugging  this  expression  in  to  1 and  by  collecting  terms  which  yields: 
(17)  P, =  Do/( l-d,)  +  (1+X  +  G  - Tn  -  Sp  - Zo),/( l-d,)  +  [d,/( 1  dl)]D,l; 
where  Do/(l-d,)  >  0,  1/(1-d,)  >  0,  and  d,/(l-d,)  >  0. 
Recall  that  fixed  investment  changes  in  response  to  a change  in  the  economic 
environment  as  determined  by  the  level  of  entrepreneurial  savings  and  the  change  in  the  rate 
of  profits  (influenced  largely  by  changes  in  the  level  of  profits).  Thus  fixed  investment  is 
written  as: 
(18)  & = b,  + b,(P,,)  + b,(AP,,); 
where  b,  >  0,  b,  >  0,  b,  >  0. 24 
The  government  purchase  equation  is  written  as  a linear  function  of  net  tax  receipts 
and  government  purchases  of  the  past  period:  i.e: 
(19)  G, =  ho  + h,(Tn,)  + hz(GJ; 
where  ho  >  0,  hl  >=<  0  (depending  upon  the  government  budget  stance). 
Personal  savings  is  expressed  as  a linear  function  of  last  period’s  level  of  savings  and 
the  current  level  of  disposable  income;  i.e.: 
(20)  SP,  =  Spa  +  s,(Yd)  +  sz(Sp,,); 
where  Spo  >  0;  0  <  s,  <  1, and  s2 >  0. 
Following  Kalecki  (1968),  aggregate  income  can  be  written  as  a function  of  profits,  by 
first  specifying  the  wage  and  salary  (gross  of  taxes)  share  as: 
(21)  VN  = B(lN)  + a; 
where  V  =  wage  and  salary  bill;  B  =  the  salary  bill  and  a  = the  wage  share  of  aggregate 
income.  By  defining  V  =  Y  - X, where  n: = pre-tax  corporate  profits  +  indirect  business  taxes 
+ other  incomes,17  and  by  substituting  this  expression  into  21  and  collecting  terms,  aggregate 
income  can  be  written  as: 
(22)  Y  =  (l/l-ct)[B  +  Pg  + Ti  +  0101; 
where  Ti  =  indirect  business  taxes;  and  010  = other  incomes  (assumed  to  be  autonomous). 
By  assuming  that  the  wage  bill’s  share  can  be  written  as  a function  of  the  tax  bill  share  of 
17The other  incomes  include,  for  example,  rental  income,  proprietors  income,  and  net  interest, 
which  are  assumed  to  be  autonomous. 25 
corporate  cost  in  a previous  period,  through,  for  example,  the  corporate  markup;  i.e.:” 
(23)  a  =  ao  +  a,[(TCNc-P),,]; 
where  Yc  =  the  corporate  domestic  product,  v  =  a previous  period,  1 - 4,  ao  >  0;  and 
a,  >=C  0,  depending  upon  the  pricing  behavior  of  firms,  the  aggregate  level  of  income  can  be 
written  as: 
(24)  Y, =  B’/( 1  - ao  - ti)  +  Pg/( 1-  ao  - ti)  +  a,[(Y,)(TCNc-P),.,]I(  1  -ao  - ti); 
assuming  Ti  = Tio  +  ti(Y);  and  where  B’  =  B  + Tio  +  010. 
Empirical  Estimates 
Equations  17,  18,  19,  20  and  24  were  estimated  using  quarterly  data  for  four  periods: 
1947  -  1960;  1961  -  1972;  1973  -1980;  1981  -  1993:Ql.  Each  of  the  variables  were  deflated 
using  the  GDP  deflator  for  the  reason  mentioned  above.  The  method  of  estimation  was  either 
ordinary  least  squares  or  Beach  and  McKinnon’s  maximum  likelihood  method  or  the 
Corchrane  and  Orcutt’s 
to  six  quarters.  Only  a 
technique.”  Investment  was  regressed  using  lags  ranging  from  two 
sample  of  these  results  are  presented.  The  regression  results  are 
“I  am  grateful  to  Wynne  Godley  for  suggesting  the  use  of  the  ratio  of  corporate  taxes  to 
corporate  costs. 
‘gIdeally  two  or three-stage  least  squares  should  be used  to  estimate  the  structural  parameters 
in  a  simultaneous  equation  system.  The  above  techniques  were  utilized  because  a  complete 
macro  model  was  not  specified,  and  the  purpose  of  this  analysis  is  strictly  illustrative. 26 
summarized  in  Table  2  below  and  the  regression  output  is provided  in  the  Appendix. 
Table  2.  Sample  Regression  Results  (t-statistics  in parenthesis). 
1947:Q3 to  1960:Q4zo 
P, =  .382  +  1.02(1+X  +  G  - Tn  -  Sp  - Zo),  +  .942D,, 
(.227)  (5 1.68)  (16.40) 
I, =  123.24  +.207P,_,  -.091(P,,  - PJ 
(5.02)  (1.84)  (-.989) 
G, =  9.64  +  .1271Tn,  +  .856G,, 
(.853)  (2.00)  (14.15) 
Sp,=  -23.75  +  .058Yd  +  .407sp,, 
(-1.52)  (3.22)  (3.41) 
Y, =  1332.06  +  .842Pg,  +  .438[(Y,)(TCNc-P),,] 
(4.64)  (5.19)  (3.04) 
1961:Ql  to  1972:Q4 
P, =  1.94  +  1.02(1+X  +  G  - Tn  -  Sp  - Zo),  +  .942D,, 
(.920)  (58.55)  (31.12) 
I, =  -25.0  +  l.O3P,,  -  .520&  - Pt.3) 
(-1.39)  (16.30)  (-5 .OO) 
R2  =  .99  DW  =  2.01 
R2  =  .39  DW  =  1.57 
R2  =  .95  DW  = 2.14 
R2  =  .64  DW  =  2.05 
R2  =  .62  DW  =  .925 
R2=.99  DW=1.98 
R2=.86  DW=  1.54 
“The  investment  equation  was  estimated  for  the  period  1947:43  to  196O:Q4,  and  the  GDP 
equation  was  estimated  for  the  period  1947:44  to  196O:Q4 G, =  13.50  + .027Tn,  + .956G,., 
(1.95)  (.641)  (23.82) 
Sp,= -68.2 1  +  .102Yd,  + .103  sp,, 
(-1.80)  (3.25)  (4.72) 
Y, =  1525.32  + 2.4OPg, + .605([(Y,)(TCNc-P),,] 
(4.16)  (7.43)  (1.58) 
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R2=.99  DW=  1.53 
R2 = .52  DW  =  1.84 
R2 =  .68  DW  =  1.31 28 
1973:Ql  to  198O:Q4 
P, =  -12.59  +  1.06(1+X  +  G  - Tn  -  Sp  - Zo),  +  .927D,_,  R2=.99  DW=1.83 
(-1.68)  (45.48)  (16.74) 
I, = 226.73  +  .422P,_5  -  .096(P,,-P,,)  R2  =  .70  DW  =  1.17 
(3.37)  (3.02)  (-.602) 
G,  =  2.49  +  .030Tn,  +  .972G,_, 
(.089)  (1 S3)  (2 1.65) 
Sp,=  10.69  +  .0122Yd,  +  .792Sp,, 
(.166)  (.613)  (5.05) 
Y, =  2557.76  +  1.46Pg,  +  .396[(Y,)(TC/Yc-P),,] 
R2=.95  DW=  1.78 
R2  =  .55  DW  =  1.94 
R2=.94  DW=1.53 
(12.89)  (7.07) 
1981:Q4  to  1993141 
P, =  30.28  +  .977(1+X 
(1.68)  (22.26) 
I, =  331.40  +  .288P,, 
(3.63)  (1.87) 
G, =  21.78  +  .012Tn, 
(1.69)  (.446) 
Sp,=  213.85  -  .0389Yd, 
(2.85)  (-2.56) 
+’ 
(1.70) 
G  - Tn  -  Sp  - Zo),  +  .904D,,  R2  =  .99  DW  =  1.97 
(16.11) 
-  .012(P,z  - Pt.3)  R2  =  .81  DW  =  1.12 
(-.084) 
+  .969G3,,  R2  =  .99  DW  =  2.06 
(39.40) 
+  .529Sp,_,  R2  =  .58  DW  =  2.09 
(4.07) 
Y, =  3459.88  +  1.25Pg,  +  .461 [(Y,)(TCNc-P),,] 
(6.22)  (4.49)  (1.84) 
R2  =  .79  DW  =  .73 29 
For  the  period  1947:Q3  to  196O:Q4  , the  estimates  suggest  that  very  little  tax  shifting 
was  occurring.  Consider  the  latter  three  equations  for  this  period.  First,  the  relationship 
between  the  change  in  government  purchases  and  the  change  in  net  tax  receipts  is  relatively 
small  at  .1271.  This  coefficient  suggests  that  government  took  a  somewhat  contractionary 
budget  stance.  Second,  the  coefficient  on  the  latter  term  on  the  income  equation  is  positive 
and  statistically  significant.  This  positive  term  indicates  that  the  distribution  parameter  and 
the  aggregate  level  of  income  moved  in  the  same  direction  as  the  change  in  corporate  profits 
tax’s  share  of  total  costs  (lagged  two  quarters).  Insofar  as  this  higher  level  of  income 
encouraged  additional  savings,  the  level  of  profits  is  reduced,  and  the  incidence  of  the  tax  on 
corporations  is  heightened.  The  extent  to  which  the  corporation  profits  tax  incidence  is 
heightened  is  relatively  small  though,  given  that  the  marginal  propensity  to  save  is  small.  For 
example,  with  the  aggregate  income  to  aggregate  corporate  cost  (lagged  two  quarters)  ratio 
equal  to  2.30  (standard  deviation  =  .12),  the  change  in  aggregate  income  given  a dollar 
change  in  corporate  profits  taxes  is  1.00  (2.30  times  .438);  and  the  change  in  personal  savings 
given  a change  in  corporate  profits  taxes  is  .058  (.058  times  l.OO), ceteris  paribus.  If  the 
government  purchases  and  savings  effects  are  combined,  then  the  evidence  implies  that 
corporations  shifted  some,  albeit  a  small  portion,  of  the  corporate  profits  tax  during  this 
period.  This  result  can  be  formally  represented  by  differentiating  the  profit  equation  with 
respect  to  a change  in  the  corporate  profits  tax,  TC,  assuming  that  a dollar  change  in 
corporate  profit  taxes  equals  a dollar  change  in  net  tax  receipts  and  that  a dollar  change  in 30 
disposable  personal  income  equals  a dollar  change  in  aggregate  income;  i.e.:21 
(26)  dP/dTc  =  l/(1-d,)[h,-1-s,(a,(Y,)/(Yc-P),,  +  l/(1-ao-ti))]l 
(1  +  [l/(1-d,)](s,)[l/(l-ao-ti)]}; 
or  given  the  parameter  estimates: 
(26’)  dP  =  -.974(dTc); 
The  investment  equation  did  not  perform  very  well  for  this  period.  The  profit  level 
coefficient  was  statistically  significant  at  the  90  percent  confidence  interval  and  the  change  in 
profit  coefficient  was  statistically  insignificant.  Dynamic  tax  incidence  effects,  through 
business  fixed  investment  are,  therefore,  expected  to  be  relatively  weak  during  this  period. 
For  the  period  196 1  :Ql  to  1972:Q4  similar  results  were  obtained.  However,  no  statistical 
relationship  was  found  between  net  tax  receipts  and  government  purchases,  and  the  marginal 
propensity  to  save  and  the  tax  coefficient  in  the  aggregate  income  equation  increased  (the 
latter  being  statistically  insignificant).  Given  that  no  statistical  relationship  was  found 
between  government  purchases  and  net  tax  receipts,  during  a time  when  aggregate 
government  deficits  first  became  chronic  (and  somewhat  erratic),  it  could  be  ventured  that 
“Given  the  above  assumptions,  the  change  in  post  tax  profits  given  a  change  in  corporate 
profits  tax  is: 
dP/dTC  =  (aP/aG)(dGBI’C)  +  aP/aTC  +  (aP/dSp)(aSp/dY)[(dY/aPg)(aPg/aTc)  +  aY/arC] 
/  [ 1 -  (aP/aSp)(aSp/aY)(aY/aPg)(dPg/dP)]. 31 
government  purchases  arise  independently  from  corporate  profits  tax  receipts.22  As  a 
conservative  guess,  any  tax  shifting  through  the  government’s  budget  stance  and  the  aggregate 
income  equation  is  ignored;  i.e.  hl  =  a,  =O.  Thus  the  change  in  profits  given  a dollar  change 
in  the  corporate  profits  tax  is:  dP  =  -l.O3(dTc). 
The  investment  equation  estimates  suggest  that  dynamic  tax  incidence  effects  were 
present  during  this  sample  period.  Both  the  profits  coefficient  and  the  change  in  profits 
“Whether  government  would  have  substituted  another  form  of  taxation  in the  absence  of  the 
corporate  profits  tax  is not  known.  However,  if the  government  substituted  the  personal  income 
tax  for  the  corporate  profits  tax,  the  results  would  be  quite  similar.  The  increase  in  the  personal 
income  tax  reduces  disposable  income,  consumption  and  savings.  The  extent  to  which  the  rise 
in the  personal  income  tax  reduces  corporate  profits  depends  upon  the  difference  between  the  rise 
in net  tax  receipts  and  the  fall  in  personal  savings.  For  example,  in  this  period,  a dollar  increase 
in personal  taxes  reduces  corporate  profits  by  approximately  $.95  (1 - .048;  where  MPS  =  .048). 
If  a  personal  tax  were  levied  on  specific  types  of  households,  with  h4PSs  varying  from  the 
aggregate,  then  incidence  of  the  tax  would  vary  accordingly.  In  regard  to  the  budget  stance,  in 
the  process  of  aggregation,  some  important  relationships  may  have  been  lost.  For  example,  most 
of  the  states  in  the  United  States  have  balanced  budget  requirements.  Under  this  law,  states  may 
determine  their  spending  requirements  then  raise  taxes  accordingly.  The  state  budget  process 
(coupled  with  the  deductibility  of  the  state  corporate  profits  tax  at  the  Federal  level)  may  thus 
generate  an  economic  incidence  of  state  corporate  profits  tax  that  is  quite  distinct  from  the 
economic  incidence  of  the  federal  corporate  profits  tax. 32 
coefficient  are  statistically  different  from  zero. 
However,  the  change  in  profits  coefficient  did  not  have  the  expected  positive  sign. 
Nonetheless,  these  results  do  suggest  that  corporations’  incidence  of  the  profits  tax  is 
heightened  by  the  relationship  between  investment  and  profits.  If,  for  example,  a dollar 
decrease  in  the  profits 
profits  would  increase 
For  the  period 
tax  increases  corporate  profits  by  $1.03,  then  investment  and  corporate 
by  $.5 10 two  quarters  hence.23 
1973:Ql  to  198O:Q4  similar  results  were  obtained.  However,  the 
marginal  propensity  to  save  was  not  statistically  different  from  zero.  With  a  statistically 
insignificant  MPS  and  a  statistically  insignificant  tax  coefficient  in  the  aggregate  income 
equation,  corporations’  short-period  incidence  of  the  corporate  profit  tax  is:  dP  =  [-l/(  l- 
d,)]dTc  =  -l.O6(dTc). 
The  investment  equation  estimates  are  very  similar  to  those  in  the  previous  period  and, 
again,  suggests  that  dynamic  tax  incidence  effects  are  present.  Given  the  relationship  of 
investment  to  the  change  in  profits,  a dollar  reduction  in  corporate  profit  taxes  increases 
investment  and  corporate  profits  by  $.447  ($1.06  times  .422)  five  quarters  hence. 
The  period  198 1  :Q4  to  1993:Ql  bears  some  interesting  results  because  the  estimated 
marginal  propensity  to  save  is  negative  and  statistically  different  from  zero.  This  result 
indicates  that  the  growth  in  income’s  impact  on  corporate  profits  is  heightened  by  the 
behavior  of  savings.  As  a consequence,  given  the  positive  tax  coefficient  in  the  aggregate 
23The profit  equation  can  be  rewritten  as: 
& =  -25.0  +  (1.030  -  .520)P,2  +  .520P,3. 33 
income  equation  (which  is  statistically  different  from  zero  at  the  90%  confidence  interval),  the 
corporate  burden  of  the  tax  is  less  than  the  legal  burden;  i.e  dP  =  -.940(dTc);  where  the 
average  ratio  of  real  GDP  to  corporate  costs  (lagged  two  periods)  equals  2.140  and  its 
standard  deviation  is  .054. 
The  estimates  of  the  investment  equation  suggest  that  dynamic  tax  incidence  effects 
are  present  although  weak.  The  profits  coefficient  is  statistically  different  from  zero  at  the 
90%  confidence  interval.  These  effects,  again,  will  heighten  corporations’  burden  of  the  tax 
in  the  long  period. 
Conclusions. 
The  purpose  of  this  paper  was  to  consider  the  factors  that  impact  on  the  economic 
incidence  of  the  corporate  profits  tax.  If  the  market  clearing/full  employment  assumption  is 
dropped,  then  the  incidence  of  the  corporate  profits  tax  can  be  analyzed  using  a Keynesian 
(macroeconomic)  model.  Within  such  a model  the  incidence  of  the  corporate  profits  tax  is 
determined  by  two  sets  of  effects  :  1) a public  sector  effect  which  depends  upon  the 
government’s  budget  stance;  and  2)  a private  sector  effect  which  depends  upon:  a)  the 
reaction  of  personal  savings  to  the  tax;  b)  the  reaction  of  investment  to  the  tax  in  the  long 
period;  and  c)  the  change  in  corporate  markups  with  respect  to  the  tax.  As  shown,  a dollar 
increase  in  the  corporate  profits  tax,  holding  other  things  constant,  results  in  a dollar  reduction 
in  post-tax  corporate  profits,  but  this  effect  is  mitigated  depending  upon  the  public  and  the 
private  sector  effects.  If  the  government  spends  the  corporate  profit  tax  receipts  on  final 
goods  and  services,  corporations’  incidence  of  the  profits  tax  is  reduced  depending  upon  the 34 
reaction  of  personal  savings  to  the  resultant  change  in  aggregate  income.  Moreover,  if 
corporations  respond  to  the  tax  by  altering  markups,  then  the  economic  incidence  of  the  tax 
may  further  vary  from  the  legal  incidence.  These  various  effects  impact  on  future  investment, 
through  profits,  which  may  lead  to  cumulative  incidence  effects. 
In  determining  the  economic  incidence  of  the  corporate  profits  tax  the  relative 
strengths  of  these  various  effects  must  be  considered.  The  government’s  budget  stance  is  a 
policy  decision  and  little  a priori  can  be  said  about  that.  However,  some  speculation  can  be 
made  about  the  relative  strengths  of  the  private  sector  effects.  The  private  sector  effects  are 
expected  to  be  relatively  weak.  First,  consider  the  behavior  of  savings.  If  the  marginal 
propensity  to  save  is  small,  as  the  evidence  suggests,  then  any  change  in  personal  disposable 
income  given  a change  in  the  corporate  profits  tax  is  likely  to  have  a  small  impact  on  post-tax 
corporate  profits.  Second,  the  degree  to  which  corporations  are  able  to  shift  the  corporate 
profits  tax  through  changes  in  corporate  markups  and  the  extent  to  which  changes  in  profit 
margins  impact  on  aggregate  post  tax  profits  is  diluted  by  a number  of  factors.  As  stressed 
by  Pechman  (1987),  businesses  only  know  their  tax  liability  ex  post,  and,  therefore,  the 
immediate  shifting  of  the  profits  tax  through  markup  changes  is  unlikely;  and  inter-firm 
rivalry  may  inhibit  the  degree  to  which  the  tax  is  shifted  forward  or  backward.  These 
sentiments  are  also  expressed  by  Sylos-Labini  (1979)  in  that  nondirect  costs  may  not  be 
passed  along  due  to  “interfirm”  differences.24  However  given  data  on  the  U.  K.,  Coutts, 
24Ed Slattery  has  pointed  out  to  me  that  the  corporate  profits  tax  is  not  either  a  direct  cost 
or  an  overhead  cost.  It  is  not  a direct  cost  because  it  is  not  known  at  the  time  of  production. 
It  is  not  an  overhead  costs  because,  in  all  likelihood,  it  varies  with  production. Godley  and  Nordhaus  (1978),  in  analyzing  the  relationship  between  profit  margins  and 
corporate  taxes,  have  indicated  that  little  shifting  occurs  in  the  short  period  (a year  or  less), 
35 
and  that  there  is  some  full  or  more  than  full  shifting  in  the  medium  and  long  runs 
respectively.  Even  if  full  shifting  or  more  than  full  shifting  is  the  result,  then  the  extent  to 
which  such  shifting  impacts  on  the  level  of  aggregate  post-tax  corporate  profits  depends  upon: 
1) the  change  in  aggregate  income  with  respect  to  the  change  in  profit  margins;  and  2)  the 
extent  to  which  personal  savings  changes  with  respect  to  the  change  in  aggregate  income. 
Again  if  the  marginal  propensity  to  save  is  relatively  small,  the  change  in  corporate  profits 
with  respect  to  a change  in  corporate  markups  is  expected  to  be  relatively  small.  Moreover, 
if  the  marginal  propensity  to  save  is negative,  the  change  in  corporate  post  tax  profits  with 
respect  to  the  change  in  corporate  markups  is negative  when  shifting  through  the  markup  is 
present.  With  the  private  sector  effects  relatively  minute,  the  incidence  of  the  corporate 
profits  tax  depends  largely  upon  the  government  budget  stance,  and  the  economic  incidence 
the  corporation  profits  tax  is  determined  politically  as  reflected  in  the  government’s  budget 
stance! 
of 
The  major  economic  policy  issue  associated  with  the  corporation  profits  tax  is  whether 
such  a tax  should  exist  at  all.  One  of  the  arguments  against  the  corporate  profits  tax  is  that  it 
results  in  the  double  taxation  of  income  which  distorts  capital  resource  allocation.  Clearly  if 
the  government  takes  an  appropriate  budget  stance  with  respect  to  the  corporate  profits  tax, 
then  such  double  taxation  of  income,  for  the  corporate  sector  as  a whole,  need  not  arise. 36 
Another  important  issue  is  whether  the  corporate  profits  tax  should  be  reduced  while 
government  is  downsized  as  a means  to  end  the  current  era  of  stagnation  (for  example,  see 
Norton,  Fortune,  g/16/93,  p.  34  - 48).  As  implied  by  the  discussion  above,  such  a policy  is 
not  likely  to  have  much  impact  on  corporate  profits,  and  it  may  actually  reduce  corporate 
profits  if  the  government, 
of  downsizing  is  likely  to 
effect. 
as  a result,  reduces  the  size  of  its  deficit.  Furthermore,  the  process 
reduce  aggregate  income  through  a balanced  budget  multiplier 
In  the  same  context,  there  have  been  calls  to  reduce  or  replace  the  corporate  profits  tax 
with  some  other  type  of  tax--like  a value-added  tax.  The  discussion  above  indicates  that  there 
may  be  only  small  benefits  from  doing  so.  Taxes,  in  most  forms,  if  not  accompanied  by 
government  spending  have  a depressing  effect  on  corporate  profits.  This  depressing  effect 
may  be  increased  if  the  imposition  of  the  value-added  tax  results  in  an  increase  in  the 
marginal  propensity  to  save.  However,  some  gains  could  be  derived  from  replacing  the 
corporate  profits  tax  with  a value-added  tax.  First,  the  introduction  of  the  value-added  tax  is 
more  likely  to  generate  a certain  private  sector  shifting  effect  --as  value-added  tax  is  more 
like  a direct  cost  than  is  the  profits  tax.25  As  a consequence  the  incidence  of  the  tax  will  be 
better  understood  than  the  incidence  of  the  corporate  profits  tax.  Second,  the  value-added  tax 
may  result  in  a more  efficient  allocation  of  resources  within  the  corporate  sector.  A  more 
efficient  allocation  of  resources  can  come  about  as  relatively  small  corporations  and  large 
corporations  have  the  same  shifting  basis,  and  investment  and  financial  decisions  are  no 
‘?  am  grateful  to  Tom  Karier  for  pointing  this  out  to  me. longer  based  upon  tax  considerations  but  upon  economic  considerations.  However,  whether 
these  changes  would  result  in  additional  future  investment  and  higher  corporate  profits 
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remains  to  be  seen.  Moreover,  the  impact  on  aggregate  income  of  replacing  the  corporate 
profits  tax  with  the  value  added  tax  is unknown.  As  shown  in  equation  24,  the  determinants 
of  the  aggregate  income  multiplier  include  the  wage  share  and  the  average  indirect  business 
tax  rate.  With  the  introduction  of  the  value-added  tax,  the  average  indirect  business  tax  rate 
will  increase,  raising  the  size  of  the  multiplier,  but  the  wage  share  will  decline  reducing  the 
size  of  the  multiplier,  if  business  markups  are  insensitive  to  the  elimination  of  the  corporate 
profits  tax.  The  relative  strengths  of  these  opposing  effects  determine  the  change  in  the 
income  multiplier  with  respect  to  the  introduction  of  the  value-added  tax.26 
Whatever  the  possibilities  for  the  future,  if  we  accept  the  old  adage  referred  to  by 
Stiglitz  (1988)  that  “the  best  tax  is  an  old  tax,”  then  the  corporate  profits  tax  is  here  to  stay  in 
some  form.  The  question  then  is  what  can  be  done  with  the  corporate  profits  tax  to  ensure 
economic  growth.  The  realization  that  the  economic  incidence  of  the  corporate  profits  tax  is 
determined  politically  leads  to  some  policy  questions.  For  example: 
26To more  formally  illustrate  this  point,  let  a  =  l/k;  where  k  is  the  markup. 
The  markup  by  definition  is:  k = po( 1  +ti)/wo(N/Q);  where  po  = the  initial  price  level;  N  = units 
of  labor;  Q  = units  of  output.  Differentiating  the  aggregate  income  multiplier  with  respect  to  a 
change  in  the  indirect  business  tax  rate  yields:  [l/( 1-  ao-ti)“][ 1  -(po(wo)(N/Q)/(po(  1  +ti))‘]  >  = 
<  0. 38 
1)  Should  the  government  make  use  of  the  corporate  profits  tax  to  finance  public  projects  -- 
to  build  and  rebuild  infrastructure?  If  so,  given  a positive  marginal  propensity  to  save,  how 
much  of  a deficit  should  the  government  run  to  ensure  that  the  economic  incidence  of  the 
corporate  profits  tax  is  zero? 
2)  Should  the  government  use  the  corporate  profits  tax  as  a means  to  reduce  poverty?  If  the 
recipients  of  government  transfer  payments  have  a marginal  propensity  to  save  equal  to  zero, 
then  the  tax  incidence  issues  will  be  the  same  as  in  1. 
3)  Should  the  corporate  profits  tax  be  earmarked  for  specific  purposes--for  example  projects 
with  a high  degree  of  publicness  within  the  corporate  sector  like  research  and  development, 
job  training  and  education.  The  private  costs  of  these  goods  may  be  too  high  for  individual 
corporations  to  bear.  If  the  government  makes  provisions  for  these  goods,  by  spending  the 
corporate  profits  tax,  then  the  economic  incidence  of  the  tax  will  be  slight  in  the  short  run 
and  negative  in  the  long  run  as  corporations  benefit  from  the  resulting  productivity  gains. 
Finally  this  study  has  considered  the  determinants  of  the  economic  incidence  of 
corporate  sector  as  a whole  and  it  has  ignored  the  economic  incidence  of  the  corporate  profits 
tax  for  an  individual  corporation.  When  government  plays  a large  role  in  determining  the 
economic  incidence,  it  is  the  government  distribution  of  spending  and  taxation  across 
corporations  that  determines  by  and  large  individual  corporation’s  tax  incidence.  The  winners 
are  those  corporations  that  receive  the  benefits  of  government  spending  (directly  or  indirectly) 
in  excess  of  their  tax  payments.  The  losers  (and  even  some  winners)  may  attempt  to  shift  the 
tax  through  altering  markups.  Insofar  as  these  individual  corporations  are  able  to  adjust  their 
markups,  the  corporate  incidence  of  the  profits  tax  may  be  negative.  In  contrast,  if 39 
government  plays  a passive  role,  where  the  budget  process  is  totally  ad  hoc,  where  corporate 
profit  taxes  are  unrelated  to  the  rest  of  the  budget,  then  the  economic  incidence  of  the 
corporate  profits  tax  on  individual  corporations  rest  with  individual  corporation’s  ability  to 
shift  the  tax  through  altering  markups. 40 
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Appendix 
Deriving  the  Corporate  Profits  Identity  from  the  National  Income  and  Product  Accounts 
In  the  National  Income  and  Product  Accounts  the  following  relationships  are  defined: 
GDP  (expenditures)  =  Personal  Consumption  Expenditures  (C) 
+  Gross  Private  Investment  (I) 
+ Net  Exports  (XNET) 
+  Government  Purchases  (G) 
GNP  =  GDP 
+  Receipts  of  factor  income  from  the  rest  of 
the  world  (XSF) 
GDP  = 
- Payments  of  factor  income  to  the  rest  of  the 
world  (MSF) 
GNP 
- Receipts  of  factor  income  from  the  rest  of 
the  world  (XSF) 
+  Payments  of  factor  income  to  the  rest  of  the 
world  (MSF) 
National  Income  (NI)  =  GNP 
- Consumption  of  Fixed  Capital  (NCCAJ) 
- Indirect  Business  Taxes  (NBTAX) 
- Business  Transfer  Payments  (NBTRAN) 
-  Statistical  Discrepancy  (NBSTAT) 
+  Subsidies  less  current  surplus  of  government 
enterprises  (NGSUB) 
or: 45 
National  Income  (NI)  =  Compensation  to  Employees  (YLE) 
+  Proprietors’  Income  (with  capital  consumption 
and  inventory  valuation  adjustments)  (YOP) 
+  Rental  Income  (with  capital  consumption 
adjustment)  (YRI) 
+  Corporate  Profits  (with  inventory  valuation 
and  capital  consumption  adjustments)  (YCP) 
Corporate  Profits  with  IVA  (YCVA) 
Profits  before  tax  (YCBT) 
Profits  tax  liability  (YCTL) 
Profits  after  tax  (YCAT) 
Dividends  (YCAD) 
Undistributed  Corporate 
Profit  (YCAU) 
Inventory  Valuation 
Adjustment  (YCIVA) 
Capital  Consumption  Adjustment  (YCCA) 
+ Net  interest  (YNI) 
Given  these  definitions,  GDP  is  rewritten  as: 
(1A)  GDP  =  YLE  +  YOP  +  YRI  + YCP  + YNI  + NCCAJ  + NBTAX  + NBTRAN  + 
NBSTAT  - NGSUB  - XSF  + MSF; 
or  as: 
(2A)  GDP=C+I+XNET+G 
Setting  1A  equal  to  2A  and  by  defining  consumption  of  fixed  capital  as: 
(3A)  NCCAJ  =  BALO  +  SANCALO; 
where  BALO  =  corporate  consumption  of  fixed  capital;  and  SANCALO  = noncorporate 
consumption  of  fixed  capital,  and  by  solving  for  the  sum  of  after  tax  corporate  profits  with 
inventory  valuation  and  capital  consumption  adjustments  and  the  corporate  consumption  of fixed  capital,  yields: 
46 
(4A)  YCAT  + YCIVA  +  YCCA  + BALO  =  C  + I  + XNET  +  G  + NGSUB  - YCTL  - 
NBTAX-  SANCALO  - YLE  - YOP  - YRI  - YNI  -NBTRAN  - XSF  +  MSF 
-NBSTAT 
In  order  to  derive  the  profit  identity  in  the  text,  the  following  are  added  and  subtracted  on  the 
right  hand  side  of  the  equal  sign  in  equation  4A:  dividends  (YCAD);  personal  tax  receipts 
(GRPTX);  government  transfer  payments  (GEXTR);  net  interest  paid  by  government 
(GNETI);  dividends  received  by  government  (GDIVC);  government  wage  accruals  less 
disbursements  (GWAGE);  contributions  for  social  insurance  (GRCSI);  wage  accruals  less 
disbursements  (WAGE);  personal  transfer  payments  to  foreigners  (PTPF);  capital  grants 
received  by  the  U.  S.  (net)  (XG);  and  net  corporate  interest  (YCNINT).  This  process  yields: 
(5A)  YCAT  +  YCIVA  +  YCCA  + BALO  =  C  +  I  + XNET  -  GBAL  + NGSUB  - YCBT 
- NBTAX  -  SANCALO  - YLE  - YOP  - YRI  - YNI  -NBTRAN  - XSF  +  MSF  -NBSTAT  + 
YCAD  - YCAD  +  YPX  +  GRCSI  - GEXTR  - GNETI  +  GDIVC  +  GWAGE  +  SAWA  - 
WAGE  +  PTPF  - PTPF  + XG  - XG  +  YCNINT  - YCNINT; 
where  GBAL  =  the  government  budget  surplus,  and  it  is  defined  as: 
(6A)  GBAL  =  (YPX  +  YCTL  + NBTAX  +  GRCSI)  -(G  +  GEXTR  +  GNETI  +  GDIVC 
- GSUB  +  GWAGE) 
Given  the  following  National  Income  and  Product  Account  definitions,  the  expression  for 
corporate  profits  can  be  derived. 
(7A)  YCAD  =  YCDV  +  GDIVC; 
where  YCDV  = personal  dividend  income;  and  GDIVC  = dividend  payments  to  government; 47 
@A)  SAWA  =  GWAGE  +  WAGE; 
where  SAWA  =  total  wage  accruals  less  disbursements; 
(9A)  NBTRAN  =  NBTRNP  + NBTRNF; 
where  NBTRNP  = business  transfer  payments  to  persons;  and  NBTRNF  = business  transfer 
payments  to  foreigners; 
(10A)  GEXTR  =  GEXTRP  +  GEXTRF; 
where  GEXTRP  =  government  transfer  payments  to  persons;  and  GEXTRF  =  government 
transfer  payments  to  foreigners; 
(11A)  GNETI  =  (GIPD  - GIREC)  +  GIPDF; 
where  GIPD  =  interest  paid  by  government  to  persons  and  business;  GIREC  =  interest 
received  by  government;  and  GIPFD  = net  interest  paid  by  government  to  the  rest  of  the 
world; 
(12A)  YNI  =  YPIN  - (GIPD  - GIREC)  - YNICB; 
where  YPIN  = personal  net  interest;  and  YNICB  =  interest  paid  by  consumers  to  businesses; 
(13A)  YP  =  NI  - YCP  - YNI  - GRCSI  -  SAWA  + YPIN  +  YPDV  +  GEXTRP  +  NBTRNP; 
where  YP  = personal  income; 
(14A)  YPD  =  YP  - YPX; 
where  YPD  = disposable  personal  income; 
(HA)  YPSV  =  YPD  -  C  - YNICB  - PTPF; 
where  YPSV  = personal  savings; 
(16A)  MINET  = XNET  + XG  + XSF  - MSF  - GEXTRF  - PTPF  - GIPDF  - NBTRNF. 48 
Combining  expressions  5A  through  16A  yields: 
(17A)  YCAT  +  YCIVA  +  YCCA  +  BALO  =  (I  +  MINET)  - GBAL  + YCAD  +  YCNINT 
- YPSV  -  SANCALO  -  SAWA  - XG  - RBS  - YCNINT. 
To  derive  the  expression  for  gross  post-tax  profits,  the  inventory  valuation  adjustment 
and  the  capital  consumption  adjustment  are  subtracted  from  both  sides  of  17A  and  corporate 
net  interest  is  added  to  both  sides  of  17A;  i.  e.: 
(18A)  YCAT  + BALO  + YCNINT  =  (I  + MINET  - YCIVA  - YCCA)  +  YCAD  +  YCNINT 
- YPSV  -  SANCALO  -  SAWA  - XG  - RBS 
The  Comparative  Statics  of  Corporate  Profits  Tax  Incidence 
The  model  described  in  the  text  (equations  1, 2’  3  -  14)  can  be  condensed  into  5 
equations: 
(19A)  P  =  I(&_,, 8(fc)Pt_T, APt_T)  + Xo  +G(Yp,tc,  Pg,Y)-Tp(Yp)  -Tc(tc,Pg) 
- Ti(Y)  +  D(P)  -  Sp(Yd,  Spt-1)  - Zo; 
(20A)  Y  =  Y[  a(  tc),Pg)]; 
(21A)  Yd  = Y  - CCAo  - Ti(Y)  -Tc(tc,Pg)  - Tp(Yp)  +  P  - D(P); 
(22A)  Pg  = P  + Tc(tc,Pg); 
(23A)  Yp  =  Yd  + Tp(Yp). 
By  differentiating  this  system  of  equations  with  respect  to  a change  in  the  corporate  profits 
tax  rate,  tc,  and  by  using  Cramer’s  Rule,  the  short-run  incidence  of  the  tax  can  be  determined; 
i.e.: 
(24A)  dP/dtc  =  {e44(e26){e55(e32(el3)  - e12)  -  ((e12)(e35)-e15(e32))} 49 
where: 
+  e46{e24(e12(e35)-e32(e15))  - e14(e35)} 
+  e55{e46(e12(e24)  - e14)  +  e44(e16)  - e32(e46)(e13)e24} 
+  e44(e16)e35}  /  {e14(e35)  - e24(e12(e35)  - e32(e15)) 
+  e44(ell(e35)  - e31(e15))  +  e55{e14  - e24(e12-e31(e13)) 
+  e44(ell  - e31(e13))}}; 
ell  =  1 -  dD/dP  >O; 
e12  =  -away  + aT/  ay  >=< 0; 
e13 = asp/aYd  > 0; 
e 14 = -(awapg)  + awapg  >=< 0; 
e15  =  -awayp  + a-rp/ayp  >=< 0; 
e16 = aG/atc  -  aTc/&c  >=<  0; 
e24  = -aY/apg  <  0; 
e26  =  (aY/aa)(adatc)  <  0; 
e31  =  (-ayd/aD)(aD/ap)  ; 
e32  =  (-away)  -  (audkq(  a-v  au)  < 0 
e35 = (-awa-rp)(arpmp) > 0 
e44  =  1 -  a-wapg  > 0 
e46 = aTc/atc  > 0 
e55 =  1 -  arp/ayp  > 0. 50 
If  government  purchases  and  the  distribution  coefficient  remain  constant  with  respect 
to  changes  in  net  taxes,  then  e12  >  0,  e14  >  0,  e15  > 0,  e16  <  0,  and  e26  =  0.  Under  these 
assumptions,  the  numerator  is  strictly  negative  and  the  denominator  is  strictly  positive.  If  e26 
<  0,  the  first  term  in  the  numerator  is  positive.  This  term  shows  the  effect  of  tax  shifting 
through  changes  in  corporate  markups  as reflected  in  the  distribution  coefficient. 
If  government  follows  a balanced  budget  stance  and  the  distribution  coefficient  remains 
constant  with  respect  to  changes  in  net  taxes,  then  e12  =  0,  e14  =  0,  e15  =  0,  e16  =  0,  and 
e26  =  0.  Again  the  numerator  is  strictly  negative  and  the  denominator  is  strictly  positive.  In 
this  case  the  numerator  reduces  to  -e24(e32)e46(e55)e13  <  0.  If  e26  ~0,  then  the 
numerator  is  given  by:  e55(e32)e13[e44(e26)  - e24(e46)]  >=<  0.  The  numerator  is  positive, 
if  e44(e26)  >  e24(e46). Table  1A.  Real  Gross  Post-Tax  Corporate  Profits  and  Sources  (Constant 
(1987  Dollars)  Source:  THE  NATIONAL  INCOME  AND  PRODUCT  ACCOUNTS, 












































































































































































































































(1)  Gross  post-tax  corporate  profits  equals  the  sum  of  after-tax  corporate 
profits,  net  corporate  interest  and  the  corporate  consumption  of  fixed  capital. 
(2)  Gross  investment  adjusted  equals  the  gross  investment  (business  gross 
investment  and  net  foreign  investment)  less  the  corporate  capital  consumption 































































































Real  Percent 
Dividends  Change 
& Net  Savings 
Corporate 
Interest  (1) 
33.690 
33.500  -0:006 
34.171  0.020 
41.584  0.217 
37.559  -0.097 
37.209  -0.009 
38.182  0.026 
40.090  0.050 
44.105  0.100 
45.763  0.038 
46.721  0.021 
46.988  0.006 
48.438  0.031 
50.769  0.048 
55.894  0.101 
58.364  0.044 
61.765  0.058 
68.592  0.111 
78.169  0.140 
82.653  0.057 
91.749  0.110 
96.226  0.049 
97.605  0.014 
98.011  0.004 
95.418  -0.026 
95.373  -0.000 
98.547  0.033 
109.735  0.114 
102.642  -0.065 
98.470  -0.041 
107.692  0.094 
120.564  0.120 
137.957  0.144 
143.236  0.038 
176.426  0.232 
177.446  0.006 
179.449  0.011 
187.925  0.047 
195.975  0.043 
218.163  0.113 
218.500  0.002 
224.855  0.029 
257.919  0.147 
261.165  0.013 
225.234  -0.138 
Real  Percent 


























































































(1)  The  series,  net  corporate  interest,  is unrevised. Noncorporate  Percent 
Consumption  Change 


























































































































































































Profit  Percent 
Share  of  Change 
GDP 
0.127 
0.130  0:021 
0.117  -0.108 
0.129  0.093 
0.107  -0.204 
0.102  -0.058 
0.100  -0.012 
0.104  0.037 
0.113  0.075 
0.113  0.007 
0.111  -0.025 
0.105  -0.056 
0.110  0.047 
0.106  -0.041 
0.105  -0.010 
0.106  0.015 
0.107  0.006 
0.110  0.032 
0.117  0.058 
0.117  -0.001 
0.115  -0.015 
0.112  -0.025 
0.108  -0.039 
0.105  -0.027 
0.110  0.042 
0.114  0.032 
0.121  0.061 
0.131  0.078 
0.131  -0.002 
0.133  0.013 
0.138  0.038 
0.144  0.040 
0.150  0.042 
0.142  -0.056 
0.144  0.015 
0.138  -0.043 
0.137  -0.010 
0.133  -0.032 
0.124  -0.074 
0.119  -0.040 
0.128  0.071 
0.134  0.045 
0.133  -0.005 
0.133  -0.002 
0.130  -0.024 Profit 
Tax  Share 



























































































-0.092 REGRESSION  OUTPUT 
1947:43  to  196O:Q4 
FIRST-ORDER  SERIAL  CORRELATION  OF  THE  ERROR 
MAXIMUM  LIKELIHOOD  ITERATIVE  TECHNIQUE 
CONVERGENCE  ACHIEVED  AFTER  2  ITERATIONS 
FINAL  VALUE  OF  RHO  =  -0.282055 
STANDARD  ERROR  OF  RHO  =  0.132604 
T-STATISTIC  FOR  RHO  =  -2.12705 
STATISTICS  BASED  ON  RHO-TRANSFORMED  VARIABLES 
********************************************* 
DEPENDENT  VARIABLE:  REAL  GROSS  POST-TAX  PROFITS 
SUM  OF  SQUARED  RESIDUALS  =  151.563 
STANDARD  ERROR  OF  THE  REGRESSION  =  1.72390 
MEAN  OF  DEPENDENT  VARIABLE  =  234.158 
STANDARD  DEVIATION  =  28.3898 
R-SQUARED  =  0.996452 
ADJUSTED  R-SQUARED  =  0.9963  13 
DURBIN-WATSON  STATISTIC  =  2.005 1 
F-STATISTIC(  2,  51)  =  7161.50 
LOG  OF  LIKELIHOOD  FUNCTION  =  -104.529 
NUMBER  OF  OBSERVATIONS  =  54 
ESTIMATED  STANDARD 
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  ERROR  T-STATISTIC 
C  0.3819478  1.679602  0.2274037 
REAL  EXPENDITURES*  1.016481  O.l966982E-01  5 1.67720 
(Net  Corp  Interest+Div.)(-1)  0.9417928  0.5742398E-01  16.40069 
* Defined  as  corporate  profits  less  the  sum  of  net  corporate  interest  and 
dividends 1948:Ql  to  1960:Q4 
FIRST-ORDER  SERIAL  CORRELATION  OF  THE  ERROR 
MAXIMUM  LIKELIHOOD  ITERATIVE  TECHNIQUE 
CONVERGENCE  ACHIEVED  AFTER  4  ITERATIONS 
FINAL  VALUE  OF  RHO  =  0.952739 
STANDARD  ERROR  OF  RHO  =  0.375187E-01 
T-STATISTIC  FOR  RHO  =  25.3937 
STATISTICS  BASED  ON  RHO-TRANSFORMED  VARIABLES 
********************************************* 
DEPENDENT  VARIABLE:  REAL  FIXED  NONRESIDENTIAL  INVESTMENT 
SUM  OF  SQUARED  RESIDUALS  =  1782.88 
STANDARD  ERROR  OF  THE  REGRESSION  =  6.03202 
MEAN  OF  DEPENDENT  VARIABLE  =  9.28674 
STANDARD  DEVIATION  =  7.38434 
R-SQUARED  =  0.389176 
ADJUSTED  R-SQUARED  =  0.364245 
DURBIN-WATSON  STATISTIC  =  1.5693 
F-STATISTIC(  2,  49)  =  13.7154 
LOG  OF  LIKELIHOOD  FUNCTION  =  -166.879 
NUMBER  OF  OBSERVATIONS  =  52 
ESTIMATED  STANDARD 
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  ERROR  T-STATISTIC 
C  123.2382  24.55 139  5.019601 
Corp.  Profits(-2)  0.2070622  0.1125467  1.839789 
Change  Corp.  Profits(-2)  -0.9099487E-0  1  0.9 1975 17E-0 1  -0.9893416 1947:43  to  196O:Q4 
FIRST-ORDER  SERIAL  CORRELATION  OF  THE  ERROR 
MAXIMUM  LIKELIHOOD  ITERATIVE  TECHNIQUE 
NOTE:  Lagged  dependent  variable(s)  present 
******************** 
COCHRANE-ORCUTT  ITERATIVE  TECHNIQUE 
CONVERGENCE  ACHIEVED  AFTER  2  ITERATIONS 
FINAL  VALUE  OF  RHO  =  0.547231 
STANDARD  ERROR  OF  RHO  =  0.141500 
T-STATISTIC  FOR  RHO  =  3.86736 
STATISTICS  BASED  ON  RHO-TRANSFORMED  VARIABLES 
********************************************* 
DEPENDENT  VARIABLE:  REAL  GOVERNMENT  PURCHASES 
SUM  OF  SQUARED  RESIDUALS  =  3109.99 
STANDARD  ERROR  OF  THE  REGRESSION  =  7.88668 
MEAN  OF  DEPENDENT  VARIABLE  =  142.667 
STANDARD  DEVIATION  =  36.2634 
R-SQUARED  =  0.954520 
ADJUSTED  R-SQUARED  =  0.952701 
DURBIN-WATSON  STATISTIC  =  2.1354 
F-STATISTIC(  2,  50)  =  524.694 
LOG  OF  LIKELIHOOD  FUNCTION  =  -183.114 
NUMBER  OF  OBSERVATIONS  =  53 
ESTIMATED  STANDARD 
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  ERROR  T-STATISTIC 
C  9.643686  11.30340  0.8531672 
Real  Net  Tax  Receipts  0.1271077  0.6353034E-01  2.000739 
Real  Gov’t  F’urch(-1)  0.8558099  0.6049842E-01  14.14599 
RHO(-1)  0.54723  14  0.1414999  3.867362 
NOTE:  STANDARD  ERRORS  ARE  CONSISTENT  IN  THE 
PRESENCE  OF  LAGGED  DEPENDENT  VARIABLE(S). METHOD  OF  ESTIMATION  =  ORDINARY  LEAST  SQUARES 
NOTE:  Lagged  dependent  variable(s)  present 
DEPENDENT  VARIABLE:  REAL  PERSONAL  SAVINGS 
SUM  OF  SQUARED  RESIDUALS  =  8411.69 
STANDARD  ERROR  OF  THE  REGRESSION  =  12.8427 
MEAN  OF  DEPENDENT  VARIABLE  =  73.4187 
STANDARD  DEVIATION  =  21.0143 
R-SQUARED  =  0.640602 
ADJUSTED  R-SQUARED  =  0.626508 
DURBIN-WATSON  STATISTIC  =  2.0494 
F-STATISTIC(  2,  51)  =  45.4520 
LOG  OF  LIKELIHOOD  FUNCTION  =  -212.929 
NUMBER  OF  OBSERVATIONS  =  54 
ESTIMATED  STANDARD 
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  ERROR  T-STATISTIC 
C  -23.74793  15.66487  -1.516000 
Real  Disposable  Income  0.5826453E-01  O.l809712E-01  3.219548 
Real  Pers.  Savings(-1)  0.4071675  0.1193095  3.412699 
DURBIN(1970)  T-STAT  FOR  AR(l)  =  -0.497426 1947:Q4  to  196O:Q4 
FIRST-ORDER  SERIAL  CORRELATION  OF  THE  ERROR 
MAXIMUM  LIKELIHOOD  ITERATIVE  TECHNIQUE 
CONVERGENCE  ACHIEVED  AFTER  2  ITERATIONS 
FINAL  VALUE  OF  RHO  =  0.997977 
STANDARD  ERROR  OF  RHO  =  0.282666E-02 
T-STATISTIC  FOR  RHO  =  353.058 
STATISTICS  BASED  ON  RHO-TRANSFORMED  VARIABLES 
********************************************* 
DEPENDENT  VARIABLE:  REAL  GDP 
SUM  OF  SQUARED  RESIDUALS  =  17047.2 
STANDARD  ERROR  OF  THE  REGRESSION  =  18.4647 
MEAN  OF  DEPENDENT  VARIABLE  =  17.9273 
STANDARD  DEVIATION  =  2 1.7972 
R-SQUARED  =  0.622143 
ADJUSTED  R-SQUARED  =  0.607029 
DURBIN-WATSON  STATISTIC  =  0.9250 
F-STATISTIC(  2,  50)  =  11.2320 
LOG  OF  LIKELIHOOD  FUNCTION  =  -230.956 
NUMBER  OF  OBSERVATIONS  =  53 
ESTIMATED  STANDARD 
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  ERROR  T-STATISTIC 
C  1332.056  286.7502  4.645355 
Real  Pre-Tax  Corp  Profits  0.8412800  0.1620965  5.189994 
Yt(Tc/(Yc  - Pg)(-2)**  0.4388025  0.1443620  3.039598 
___________________ 
**Yt(Tc/(Yc  - Pg)(-2)  =  GDP  in  time  t times  the  ratio  of  the  corporate  tax 
liability  to  corporate  cost  in  time  t - 2. 1961:Ql t0 1972:Q4 
FIRST-ORDER  SERIAL  CORRELATION  OF  THE  ERROR 
MAXIMUM  LIKELIHOOD  ITERATIVE  TECHNIQUE 
CONVERGENCE  ACHIEVED  AFTER  1 ITERATIONS 
FINAL  VALUE  OF  RHO  =  0.196613 
STANDARD  ERROR  OF  RHO  =  0.146486 
T-STATISTIC  FOR  RHO  =  1.34220 
STATISTICS  BASED  ON  RHO-TRANSFORMED  VARIABLES 
********************************************* 
DEPENDENT  VARIABLE:  REAL  GROSS  POST-TAX  PROFITS 
SUM  OF  SQUARED  RESIDUALS  =  113.652 
STANDARD  ERROR  OF  THE  REGRESSION  =  1.5892 1 
MEAN  OF  DEPENDENT  VARIABLE  =  231.941 
STANDARD  DEVIATION  =  33.2370 
R-SQUARED  =  0.9978  13 
ADJUSTED  R-SQUARED  =  0.997716 
DURBIN-WATSON  STATISTIC  =  1.9781 
F-STATISTIC(  2,  45)  =  10256.4 
LOG  OF  LIKELIHOOD  FUNCTION  =  -88.8154 
NUMBER  OF  OBSERVATIONS  =  48 
ESTIMATED  STANDARD 
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  ERROR  T-STATISTIC 
C  1.940919  2.110359  0.9197102 
REAL  EXPENDITURES  1  .O  18009  O.l738686E-01  58.55044 
(Net  Corp  Interest+Div.)(-1)  0.9424383  0.3028257E-01  31.12148 FIRST-ORDER  SERIAL  CORRELATION  OF  THE  ERROR 
MAXIMUM  LIKELIHOOD  ITERATIVE  TECHNIQUE 
CONVERGENCE  ACHIEVED  AFTER  3  ITERATIONS 
FINAL  VALUE  OF  RHO  =  0.810949 
STANDARD  ERROR  OF  RHO  =  0.824588E-01 
T-STATISTIC  FOR  RHO  =  9.83459 
STATISTICS  BASED  ON  RHO-TRANSFORMED  VARIABLES 
********************************************* 
DEPENDENT  VARIABLE:  REAL  NONRESIDENTIAL  FIXED  INVESTMENT 
SUM  OF  SQUARED  RESIDUALS  =  1008.27 
STANDARD  ERROR  OF  THE  REGRESSION  =  4.73349 
MEAN  OF  DEPENDENT  VARIABLE  =  54.0144 
STANDARD  DEVIATION  =  12.2173 
R-SQUARED  =  0.861287 
ADJUSTED  R-SQUARED  =  0.855122 
DURBIN-WATSON  STATISTIC  =  1.5430 
F-STATISTIC(  2,  45)  =  134.050 
LOG  OF  LIKELIHOOD  FUNCTION  =  -14 1.720 
NUMBER  OF  OBSERVATIONS  =  48 
ESTIMATED  STANDARD 
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  ERROR  T-STATISTIC 
C  -25.00005  17.98532  -1.390026 
Corp.  Profits(-2)  1.034817  0.6350072E-01  16.29615 
Change  Corp.  Profits(-2)  -0.5203  142  0.1040627  -5.000009 METHOD  OF  ESTIMATION  =  ORDINARY  LEAST  SQUARES 
NOTE:  Lagged  dependent  variable(s)  present 
DEPENDENT  VARIABLE:  REAL  GOVERNMENT  PURCHASES 
SUM  OF  SQUARED  RESIDUALS  =  2054.04 
STANDARD  ERROR  OF  THE  REGRESSION  =  6.75614 
MEAN  OF  DEPENDENT  VARIABLE  =  53 1.683 
STANDARD  DEVIATION  =  77.6659 
R-SQUARED  =  0.992755 
ADJUSTED  R-SQUARED  =  0.992433 
DURBIN-WATSON  STATISTIC  =  1.5294 
F-STATISTIC{  2,  45)  =  3083.00 
LOG  OF  LIKELIHOOD  FUNCTION  =  -158.262 
NUMBER  OF  OBSERVATIONS  =  48 
ESTIMATED  STANDARD 
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  ERROR  T-STATISTIC 
C  13.50708  6.927372 
Real  net  tax  receipts  0.2721152E-01  0.424201  lE-01 
Real  Gov’t  Purch(-  1)  0.9564725  0.4016715E-01 
DURBIN(l970)  T-STAT  FOR  AR(l)  =  1.60378 
1.949812 
0.6414770 
23.81231 FIRST-ORDER  SERIAL  CORRELATION  OF  THE  ERROR 
MAXIMUM  LIKELIHOOD  ITERATIVE  TECHNIQUE 
NOTE:  Lagged  dependent  variable(s)  present 
******************** 
COCHRANE-ORCUTT  ITERATIVE  TECHNIQUE 
CONVERGENCE  ACHIEVED  AFTER  12 ITERATIONS 
FINAL  VALUE  OF  RHO  =  0.586487 
STANDARD  ERROR  OF  RHO  =  0.265350 
T-STATISTIC  FOR  RHO  =  2.2 1024 
STATISTICS  BASED  ON  RHO-TRANSFORMED  VARIABLES 
********************************************* 
DEPENDENT  VARIABLE:  REAL  PERSONAL  SAVINGS 
SUM  OF  SQUARED  RESIDUALS  =  5445.83 
STANDARD  ERROR  OF  THE  REGRESSION  =  11.1251 
MEAN  OF  DEPENDENT  VARIABLE  =  55.08 11 
STANDARD  DEVIATION  =  15.6916 
R-SQUARED  =  0.5 19194 
ADJUSTED  R-SQUARED  =  0.497339 
DURBIN-WATSON  STATISTIC  =  1.8403 
F-STATISTIC(  2,  44)  =  23.7565 
LOG  OF  LIKELIHOOD  FUNCTION  =  -178.373 
NUMBER  OF  OBSERVATIONS  =  47 
ESTIMATED  STANDARD 
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  ERROR  T-STATISTIC 
C  -68.20455  40.70181  -1.675713 
Real  Disposable  Income  0.10 1615 1  0.402 1839E-0 1  2.526582 
Real  pers.  savings(-1)  0.1031568  0.3 179762  0.3244167 
RHO  0.5864870  0.2653502  2.210237 
NOTE:  STANDARD  ERRORS  ARE  CONSISTENT  IN  THE 
PRESENCE  OF  LAGGED  DEPENDENT  VARIABLE(S). FIRST-ORDER  SERIAL  CORRELATION  OF  THE  ERROR 
MAXIMUM  LIKELIHOOD  ITERATIVE  TECHNIQUE 
CONVERGENCE  ACHIEVED  AFTER  3 ITERATIONS 
FINAL  VALUE  OF  RHO  =  0.997838 
STANDARD  ERROR  OF  RHO  =  0.303098E-02 
T-STATISTIC  FOR  RHO  =  329.213 
STATISTICS  BASED  ON  RHO-TRANSFORMED  VARIABLES 
********************************************* 
DEPENDENT  VARIABLE:  REAL  GDP 
SUM  OF  SQUARED  RESIDUALS  =  22676.3 
STANDARD  ERROR  OF  THE  REGRESSION  =  22.448  1 
MEAN  OF  DEPENDENT  VARIABLE  =  33.1642 
STANDARD  DEVIATION  =  24.5622 
R-SQUARED  =  0.682418 
ADJUSTED  R-SQUARED  =  0.668303 
DURBIN-WATSON  STATISTIC  =  1.3096 
F-STATISTIC(  2,  45)  =  5.63483 
LOG  OF  LIKELIHOOD  FUNCTION  =  -2 18.620 
NUMBER  OF  OBSERVATIONS  =  48 
ESTIMATED  STANDARD 
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  ERROR  T-STATISTIC 
C  1525.324  366.7848  4.158636 
Real  Pre-Tax  Corp  Profits  2.403477  0.3236073  7.427141 
Yt(Tc/(Yc  - Pg)(-4  )  0.6054058  0.3843984  1.574943 1973:Ql  to  198O:Q4 
FIRST-ORDER  SERIAL  CORRELATION  OF  THE  ERROR 
MAXIMUM  LIKELIHOOD  ITERATIVE  TECHNIQUE 
CONVERGENCE  ACHIEVED  AFTER  3  ITERATIONS 
FINAL  VALUE  OF  RHO  =  0.433582 
STANDARD  ERROR  OF  RHO  =  0.163016 
T-STATISTIC  FOR  RHO  =  2.65976 
STATISTICS  BASED  ON  RHO-TRANSFORMED  VARIABLES 
********************************************* 
DEPENDENT  VARIABLE:  REAL  GROSS  POST-TAX  PROFITS 
SUM  OF  SQUARED  RESIDUALS  =  311.391 
STANDARD  ERROR  OF  THE  REGRESSION  =  3 a27683 
MEAN  OF  DEPENDENT  VARIABLE  =  277.718 
STANDARD  DEVIATION  =  38.6693 
R-SQUARED  =  0.993289 
ADJUSTED  R-SQUARED  =  0.992826 
DURBIN-WATSON  STATISTIC  =  1.8252 
F-STATISTIC(  2,  29)  =  2144.02 
LOG  OF  LIKELIHOOD  FUNCTION  =  -81.9152 
NUMBER  OF  OBSERVATIONS  =  32 
ESTIMATED  STANDARD 
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  ERROR  T-STATISTIC 
C  -12.59136  7.484259  -1.682379 
REAL  EXPENDH’URES  1.063203  0.2337581E-01  45.48303 
(Net  Corp  Interest+Div.)(-1)  0.9266788  0.5524253E-01  16.77474 FIRST-ORDER  SERIAL  CORRELATION  OF  THE  ERROR 
MAXIMUM  LIKELIHOOD  ITERATIVE  TECHNIQUE 
CONVERGENCE  ACHIEVED  AFTER  3  ITERATIONS 
FINAL  VALUE  OF  RHO  =  0.944693 
STANDARD  ERROR  OF  RHO  =  0.43 1245E-01 
T-STATISTIC  FOR  RHO  =  21.9062 
STATISTICS  BASED  ON  RHO-TRANSFORMED  VARIABLES 
********************************************* 
DEPENDENT  VARIABLE:  REAL  NONRESIDENTIAL  FIXED  INVESTMENT 
SUM  OF  SQUARED  RESIDUALS  =  3476.90 
STANDARD  ERROR  OF  THE  REGRESSION  =  10.9496 
MEAN  OF  DEPENDENT  VARIABLE  =  29.8400 
STANDARD  DEVIATION  =  19.0643 
R-SQUARED  =  0.697796 
ADJUSTED  R-SQUARED  =  0.676954 
DURBIN-WATSON  STATISTIC  =  1.1725 
F-STATISTIC(  2,  29)  =  32.4872 
LOG  OF  LIKELIHOOD  FUNCTION  =  -121.53  1 
NUMBER  OF  OBSERVATIONS  =  32 
ESTIMATED  STANDARD 
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  ERROR  T-STATISTIC 
C  226.7373  67.23203  3.372460 
Corp.  Profits(-5)  0.4222344  0.1399804  3.016381 
Change  Corp.  Profits(-5)  -0.9599514E-01  0.1594154  -0.6021698 METHOD  OF  ESTIMATION  =  ORDINARY  LEAST  SQUARES 
NOTE:  Lagged  dependent  variable(s)  present 
DEPENDENT  VARIABLE:  REAL  GOVERNMENT  PURCHASES 
SUM  OF  SQUARED  RESIDUALS  =  958.994 
STANDARD  ERROR  OF  THE  REGRESSION  =  5.75054 
MEAN  OF  DEPENDENT  VARIABLE  =  661.378 
STANDARD  DEVIATION  =  24.936  1 
R-SQUARED  =  0.950250 
ADJUSTED  R-SQUARED  =  0.946819 
DURBIN-WATSON  STATISTIC  =  1.7776 
F-STATISTIC(  2,  29)  =  276.956 
LOG  OF  LIKELIHOOD  FUNCTION  =  -99.8084 
NUMBER  OF  OBSERVATIONS  =  32 
ESTIMATED  STANDARD 
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  ERROR  T-STATISTIC 
C  2.494827  28.01962 
Real  net  tax  receipts  0.2955210E-01  O.l934704E-01 
Real  gov’t  purch(-1)  0.97202  10  0.4488803E-0  1 
DURBIN(  1970)  T-STAT  FOR  AR(l)  =  0.447508 
0.8903857E-01 
1.527474 
2 1.65434 FIRST-ORDER  SERIAL  CORRELATION  OF  THE  ERROR 
MAXIMUM  LIKELIHOOD  ITERATIVE  TECHNIQUE 
NOTE:  Lagged  dependent  variable(s)  present 
******************** 
COCHRANE-ORCUTT  ITERATIVE  TECHNIQUE 
CONVERGENCE  ACHIEVED  AFTER  4  ITERATIONS 
FINAL  VALUE  OF  RHO  =  -0.395 115 
STANDARD  ERROR  OF  RHO  =  0.203 115 
T-STATISTIC  FOR  RHO  =  -1.94528 
STATISTICS  BASED  ON  RHO-TRANSFORMED  VARIABLES 
********************************************* 
DEPENDENT  VARIABLE:  REAL  PERSONAL  SAVINGS 
SUM  OF  SQUARED  RESIDUALS  =  13619.7 
STANDARD  ERROR  OF  THE  REGRESSION  =  22.0549 
MEAN  OF  DEPENDENT  VARIABLE  =  267.709 
STANDARD  DEVIATION  =  3 1.7634 
R-SQUARED  =  0.550021 
ADJUSTED  R-SQUARED  =  0.517879 
DURBIN-WATSON  STATISTIC  =  1.9424 
F-STATISTIC(  2,  28)  =  17.1125 
LOG  OF  LIKELIHOOD  FUNCTION  =  -138.309 
NUMBER  OF  OBSERVATIONS  =  31 
ESTIMATED  STANDARD 
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  ERROR  T-STATISTIC 
C  10.68683  64.37038  0.1660208 
Real  disposable  income  0.12247  11  E-O  1  O.l998432E-0  1  0.6128357 
Real  pers.  savings(-  1)  0.79 1794 1  0.1569059  5.046298 
RHO  -0.3951149  0.2031151  -1.945276 
NOTE:  STANDARD  ERRORS  ARE  CONSISTENT  IN  THE 
PRESENCE  OF  LAGGED  DEPENDENT  VARIABLE(S). FIRST-ORDER  SERIAL  CORRELATION  OF  THE  ERROR 
MAXIMUM  LIKELIHOOD  ITERATIVE  TECHNIQUE 
CONVERGENCE  ACHIEVED  AFTER  4  ITERATIONS 
FINAL  VALUE  OF  RHO  =  0.984010 
STANDARD  ERROR  OF  RHO  =  O.l98014E-03 
T-STATISTIC  FOR  RHO  =  49.6939 
STATISTICS  BASED  ON  RHO-TRANSFORMED  VARIABLES 
********************************************* 
DEPENDENT  VARIABLE:  REAL  GDP 
SUM  OF  SQUARED  RESIDUALS  =  23010.3 
STANDARD  ERROR  OF  THE  REGRESSION  =  28.1684 
MEAN  OF  DEPENDENT  VARIABLE  =  89.3604 
STANDARD  DEVIATION  =  98.407  1 
R-SQUARED  =  0.9363  13 
ADJUSTED  R-SQUARED  =  0.93 192 1 
DURBIN-WATSON  STATISTIC  =  1.5302 
F-STATISTIC(  2,  29)  =  174.673 
LOG  OF  LIKELIHOOD  FUNCTION  =  -152.379 
NUMBER  OF  OBSERVATIONS  =  32 
ESTIMATED  STANDARD 
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  ERROR  T-STATISTIC 
C  2557.759  198.3943  12.89230 
Real  Pre-Tax  Corp  Profits  1.461619  0.2066495  7.072938 
Y t(Tc/(Yc  - Pg) 1  0.3953789  0.2327287  1.698883 1981:Q4  to  1993:Ql 
FIRST-ORDER  SERIAL  CORRELATION  OF  THE  ERROR 
MAXIMUM  LIKELIHOOD  ITERATIVE  TECHNIQUE 
CONVERGENCE  ACHIEVED  AFTER  3  ITERATIONS 
FINAL  VALUE  OF  RHO  =  0.641827 
STANDARD  ERROR  OF  RHO  =  0.108639 
T-STATISTIC  FOR  RHO  =  5.90788 
STATISTICS  BASED  ON  RHO-TRANSFORMED  VARIABLES 
********************************************* 
DEPENDENT  VARIABLE:  REAL  GROSS  POST-TAX  PROFITS 
SUM  OF  SQUARED  RESIDUALS  =  992.129 
STANDARD  ERROR  OF  THE  REGRESSION  =  4.64414 
MEAN  OF  DEPENDENT  VARIABLE  =  214.287 
STANDARD  DEVIATION  =  37.2580 
R-SQUARED  =  0.985 126 
ADJUSTED  R-SQUARED  =  0.984479 
DURBIN-WATSON  STATISTIC  =  1.9710 
F-STATISTIC(  2,  46)  =  1521.68 
LOG  OF  LIKELIHOOD  FUNCTION  =  -143.490 
NUMBER  OF  OBSERVATIONS  =  49 
ESTIMATED  STANDARD 
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  ERROR  T-STATISTIC 
C  30.27686  18.04622  1.677739 
REAL  EXPENDITURES  0.9766373  0.4387  188E-0 1  22.26112 
(Net  Corp  Interest+Div.)(-1)  0.9043116  0.5611870E-01  16.11426 FIRST-ORDER  SERIAL  CORRELATION  OF  THE  ERROR 
MAXIMUM  LIKELIHOOD  ITERATIVE  TECHNIQUE 
CONVERGENCE  ACHIEVED  AFTER  3 ITERATIONS 
FINAL  VALUE  OF  RHO  =  0.925888 
STANDARD  ERROR  OF  RHO  =  0.473589E-01 
T-STATISTIC  FOR  RHO  =  19.5505 
STATISTICS  BASED  ON  RHO-TRANSFORMED  VARIABLES 
********************************************* 
DEPENDENT  VARIABLE:  REAL  NONRESIDENTIAL  FIXED  INVESTMENT 
SUM  OF  SQUARED  RESIDUALS  =  5512.25 
STANDARD  ERROR  OF  THE  REGRESSION  =  10.9468 
MEAN  OF  DEPENDENT  VARIABLE  =  39.9795 
STANDARD  DEVIATION  =  24.5488 
R-SQUARED  =  0.810605 
ADJUSTED  R-SQUARED  =  0.802371 
DURBIN-WATSON  STATISTIC  =  1.1197 
F-STATISTIC(  2,  46)  =  97.6983 
LOG  OF  LIKELLHOOD  FUNCTION  =  -186.213 
NUMBER  OF  OBSERVATIONS  =  49 
ESTIMATED  STANDARD 
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  ERROR  T-STATISTIC 
C  33 1.4006  91.34218  3.628122 
Corp.  Profits(-2)  0.2881899  0.1544108  1.866384 
Change  Corp.  Profits(-2)  -O.l118481E-01  0.1329056  -0.8415608E-01 METHOD  OF  ESTIMATION  =  ORDINARY  LEAST  SQUARES 
NOTE:  Lagged  dependent  variable(s)  present 
DEPENDENT  VARIABLE:  REAL  GOVERNMENT  PURCHASES 
SUM  OF  SQUARED  RESIDUALS  =  3419.72 
STANDARD  ERROR  OF  THE  REGRESSION  =  8.62217 
MEAN  OF  DEPENDENT  VARIABLE  =  842.652 
STANDARD  DEVIATION  =  80.969  1 
R-SQUARED  =  0.989133 
ADJUSTED  R-SQUARED  =  0.988660 
DURBIN-WATSON  STATISTIC  =  2.062  1 
F-STATISTIC(  2,  46)  =  2093.49 
LOG  OF  LIKELIHOOD  FUNCTION  =  -173.543 
NUMBER  OF  OBSERVATIONS  =  49 
ESTIMATED  STANDARD 
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  ERROR  T-STATISTIC 
C  2 1.77728  12.91365 
Real  net  tax  receipts  O.l151267E-01  0.2581629E-01 
Real  gov’t  purch.(-1)  0.9694887  0.2460736E-01 
DURBIN(l970)  T-STAT  FOR  AR(l)  =  -0.382679 
1.686377 
0.4459462 
39.39833 METHOD  OF  ESTIMATION  =  ORDINARY  LEAST  SQUARES 
NOTE:  Lagged  dependent  variable(s)  present 
DEPENDENT  VARIABLE:  REAL  PERSONAL  SAVINGS 
SUM  OF  SQUARED  RESIDUALS  =  36448.0 
STANDARD  ERROR  OF  THE  REGRESSION  =  28.1487 
MEAN  OF  DEPENDENT  VARIABLE  =  187.725 
STANDARD  DEVIATION  =  42.2840 
R-SQUARED  =  0.575302 
ADJUSTED  R-SQUARED  =  0.556837 
DURBIN-WATSON  STATISTIC  =  2.0874 
F-STATISTIC(  2,  46)  =  31.1562 
LOG  OF  LIKELIHOOD  FUNCTION  =  -231.518 
NUMBER  OF  OBSERVATIONS  =  49 
ESTIMATED  STANDARD 
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  ERROR  T-STATISTIC 
C  213.8491  74.94920  2.853254 
Real  disposable  income  -0.38979  16E-0 1 O.l727945E-0  1  -2.255811 
Real  pers.  savings(-1)  0.5285255  0.1299062  4.068517 
DURBIN(  1970)  T-STAT  FOR  AR( 1) =  -1.05683 FIRST-ORDER  SERIAL  CORRELATION  OF  THE  ERROR 
MAXIMUM  LIKELIHOOD  ITERATIVE  TECHNIQUE 
CONVERGENCE  ACHIEVED  AFTER  2  ITERATIONS 
FINAL  VALUE  OF  RHO  =  0.997934 
STANDARD  ERROR  OF  RHO  =  0.2894318-02 
T-STATISTIC  FOR  RHO  =  344.792 
STATISTICS  BASED  ON  RHO-TRANSFORMED  VARIABLES 
********************************************* 
DEPENDENT  VARIABLE:  REAL  GDP 
SUM  OF  SQUARED  RESIDUALS  =  53275.5 
STANDARD  ERROR  OF  THE  REGRESSION  =  34.03 18 
MEAN  OF  DEPENDENT  VARIABLE  =  38.8787 
STANDARD  DEVIATION  =  44.3 123 
R-SQUARED  =  0.721014 
ADJUSTED  R-SQUARED  =  0.708884 
DURBIN-WATSON  STATISTIC  =  0.7307 
F-STATISTIC(  2,  46)  =  17.6901 
LOG  OF  LIKELIHOOD  FUNCTION  =  -243.563 
NUMBER  OF  OBSERVATIONS  =  49 
ESTIMATED  STANDARD 
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  ERROR  T-STATISTIC 
C  3459.879  556.2708  6.219775 
Real  Pre-Tax  Carp  Profits  1.252338  0.2790415  4.488000 
Yt(Tc/(Yc  - Pg)(-2)  0.4608960  0.2508  118  1.837617 